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After decades of de-urbanisation under the 
socialist economic regime, urban growth 
is now exploding in Vietnam: the country’s 
urban population has doubled since 1980.
This Focus oﬀers a fresh perspective 
on the production of urban forms, the 
reconfiguration of local governance, 
and the renegotiation of daily practices, 
mainly in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
Our intention is not only to highlight  
the path-breaking transformations  
taking place in today’s Vietnam,  
but also to contribute to the ‘Asianisation’ 
of urban studies’ paradigms through 
grounded analysis and interpretation,  
based on extensive fieldwork conducted 
with local colleagues in Vietnamese  
cities and neighbourhoods.
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Engaging with the urban field in Vietnam: crossing approaches
In a world where more than 50% of the population lives in cities,1 Vietnam and its current 34% of urban dwellers2  
remains associated with rurality in the global imaginary. But this last figure should be put into perspective: after  
decades of de-urbanisation under the socialist regime the national urban growth is now exploding; the country’s urban 
population has doubled since 1980, with an oﬃcial average growth of 3.4% per year.3 Beyond this steady demographic 
development, urbanised areas multiplied by 4 between 1995 and 2010.4 Most of the urban growth takes place in and 
around Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), even though secondary cities are also engaged in a rebalancing process.5 
Today these two main metropolises of the country have respectively 7 and 7.9 million inhabitants.6 In addition, since  
the introduction of đổi mới reforms in the mid-1980s,7 cities have been oﬃcially recognised as the engine of national  
economic growth by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), which leads the country. 
In this renewed context, our Focus oﬀers a fresh perspective on the production of urban forms, the reconfiguration  
of local management, and the renegotiation of daily practices in Vietnamese cities. Our intention is not only to  
highlight the path-breaking transformations taking place in Vietnam today, but also to contribute to the ‘Asianisation’  
of urban studies paradigms through grounded analysis and interpretation,8 and to discuss an alternative theoretical 
framework, based on extensive fieldwork in Vietnamese cities and neighbourhoods.
Marie Gibert, Clément Musil, Emmanuelle Peyvel and Juliette Segard
Producing & living 
the city in Vietnam 
theFocus
A couple drinking 
sugarcane juice at  
Me Trì (The Manor),  
a new urban area 
west of Hanoi 
(photo by Vincent 
Bertholon).
Engaging with the urban field in Vietnam: crossing approaches continued
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Unfolding the layers of the Vietnam urban fabric
If contemporary urban transformations are taking place in 
increasingly globalised contexts, they should also be under-
stood by considering the long-term urban history that explains 
the distinctiveness of the Vietnamese metropolises’ ‘art of 
being global’.9 Furthermore, their contemporary ‘openness’ 
echoes the previous international links these cities kept during 
the historical contexts of Chinese Diaspora trade, French 
colonisation and the socialist bloc-cooperation period. Thus, 
after experiencing colonisation, decades of war, socialism  
and de-urbanisation,10 followed by the national reunification  
of 1976 and đổi mới reforms, diﬀerent Vietnamese cities  
reveal diﬀerent urban trajectories.
In that regard, the literature has contrasted Hanoi and 
HCMC for a long while: HCMC is usually depicted as the 
country’s liberal and international vanguard, while Hanoi  
is often associated with bureaucracy and Party enhanced 
control. Hanoi, as the national capital city, is indeed the place 
where decisions are taken, while HCMC is considered to be  
the potential economic engine of the country. The diﬀerent 
places they occupy in the urban hierarchy continue to influence 
the understanding of Vietnam’s urbanisation, even though  
this dichotomy is becoming less significant these days.  
The two metropolises are now engaged in a similar trend  
of opening-up and metropolisation, which leads to a  
progressive ‘convergence process’. Thus, while concentrating 
mainly on these two leading cities – thereby also reflecting 
the reality of the academic production today, as far as urban 
Vietnam is concerned – this Focus will go beyond the simple 
juxtaposition of two competing cities, by highlighting the 
complementarities of their two ‘worlding paths’.11
Metropolisation: towards a reading of the  
‘worlding paths’ of Vietnamese cities
With the adoption of a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ 
and the opening-up to international financial flows, major 
Vietnamese cities, as well as secondary ranking cities like 
Danang located in economic development corridors,12 are 
stimulated by a common metropolisation process. 
In this Focus, metropolisation is understood as a process 
that aﬀects a city both in its forms and functions, and is 
characterised by a concentration of population, activities,  
and wealth. This phenomenon cannot, however, be reduced  
to its demographic dimension only. Its originality relates  
to the diversification of the activities, to the concentration  
of strategic economic functions, and to the attractiveness 
of and accessibility to communication networks at various 
scales. In particular, metropolisation integrates cities into the 
networks of the global economy.13 While they take part in this 
tendency, Asian cities display specific features. The desakota 
pattern defined by McGee suggests that metropolisation leads 
to the assembling of territories that combine agricultural and  
non-agricultural activities.14 In addition, by using cheap means  
of transport, such as motorbikes, transportation of goods and  
people is facilitated between inner cities and their fringes.
In Hanoi and HCMC the early signs of metropolisation 
appeared with the arrival of the first Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) at the beginning of the 1990s. Though buildings of more 
than ten storeys were already built in HCMC during the 1960s 
and 1970s, Vietnamese cities generally remained quite ‘low’, 
until the FDI triggered the construction of the first high-rise 
buildings. This paved the way to the verticalisation and ‘super-
sizing’ of the city. The construction of the New World Hotel  
in HCMC in 1991, and the Hanoi Tower in 1996 (that combines 
service apartments, hotel, oﬃces and retail functions), 
embodied the first international functions and vertical shapes. 
On the outskirts, FDI materialised through the construction  
of rescaled industrial zones and factories (see the article by  
Trần Khắc Minh in this Focus section). For instance, the Japanese 
firm Honda settled its first motorbike assemblage chain in  
the North of Hanoi nearby the international airport in 1997.
In addition, urban sprawl has progressed rapidly. In the  
last 20 years, in both cities, an average of 1,000 hectares  
per year of agricultural land has been urbanised. As a result, 
the inner cities and their outskirts (i.e., the peri-urban areas) 
were densified. Noteworthy landmarks of this trend are the  
experimental residential areas, known as ‘new urban areas’ 
(Khu đô thi mới), which city authorities initiated in the early 
1990s. Both Hanoi and HCMC started to develop their iconic 
projects in 1996, with Ciputra in Hanoi and Saigon South  
in HCMC. These two projects represent the kick-start of large 
scale urban projects in Vietnamese cities (over 400 hectares) 
located at the cities’ outskirts, where private and foreign 
investors and developers are involved (see article by Segard). 
Furthermore, there has clearly been a shift from an organic 
growth of the city to ‘project-based development’ (see article 
by Gibert and Phạm Thái Sơn).15 
In this context, the construction of new mass rapid transit 
systems became a major issue (see article by Musil and Vương 
Khánh Toàn). Furthermore, while cities deal with planned 
adjustment phases to frame the construction of modern 
economic infrastructures, urban spontaneous developments 
also continue.
A street scene in 
Phú My˜ Hu ng, a 
new urban area in 
HCMC, with the 
Bitexco Tower, a city 
landmark, in the 
background (photo 
by Marie Gibert).
A reordering of stakeholders: urbanisation  
as a political process
Spaces are changing; so too are the stakeholders. Even though 
the economic transition and international opening-up have 
been orchestrated by the Party, the Regime has evolved,  
influenced both from the ‘outside’ (regional powers, 
international donors, Western countries) and from the ‘inside’ 
(intellectuals, Party branches, religious groups, inhabitants, 
etc.). The current production of the city, governance issues 
and power relations, all illustrate the complexification of the 
political, economic and social life of the country. 
Stakeholders involved in planning, construction, acquisition 
of land or renovation of urban cores are much greater in num-
bers nowadays, and they keep diversifying. Public authorities 
have kept hold of the driving seat, controlling the land use sys-
tem, investments licences or Oﬃcial Development Assistance 
targets. However, they are now being challenged. On the one 
hand, private entrepreneurs (both domestic - notably the 
recomposing State-Owned Enterprise - and international) have 
growing expectations in terms of land availability, flexibility, 
incentives and enabling business environment. On the other 
hand, inhabitants are progressively being emancipated from 
rigid structures of control and mobilisation. Thus, they now 
participate in the production of the city ‘from the bottom-up’ 
and contribute to the emergence of a new urban society, with 
the wish to benefit from the country’s development in general.
Even though the narrative of ‘the rights to the city’ is not 
claimed, people are negotiating, questioning policy goals, 
encroaching the rules every day to have a say in their city’s  
evolution, to be recognised as urban citizens, and to  
participate, even on the margins, in decision-making. Thus, 
power relations and structures are transforming as a result 
of every stakeholder’s attempt to find his or her place in an 
evolving system, through economic competition, negotiation 
or protest. In fact, everyone contributes to these changes –  
no matter their social status, gender, origin or age – because 
their influence also lies in daily practices, ritual customs (see 
the articles by Pannier and by Ngô Thị Thu Trang), or leisure 
activities (see the article by Peyvel and Võ Sáng Xuân Lan) that 
are not always politicised, but which do nevertheless shape  
the global evolution of the country and society. 
Practical development choices, growth policies and  
urban models have to be formulated and developed by the 
authorities. Concretely, the Party-State faces both short-term 
and long-term challenges: housing production and service 
provision, the climate change threat to river delta regions 
(already subject to floods), congestion issues and pollution, 
heritage preservation (see the article on urban heritage 
preservation policies in this Focus section) and promotion  
of ‘modern’ urban products, such as shopping malls or 
condominiums.
What is crucial now for the Regime is to decide how to  
manage developments, which arrangements to adopt, and 
how to mediate between economic interests and political 
/social stability. In other words, how to make the system work? 
For the authorities, the objective is to keep control and power 
over urbanisation while largely delegating, or privatising,  
the production of the city. 
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A view from the 
corner of Lý Chính 
Thă´ng and Trâ`n 
QuÔ´c Tha’o streets 
in HCMC (photo 
by Marie Gibert).
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It is important to bear in mind that the Regime’s stability 
relies on its ability – more or less – to ensure growth and  
to improve living conditions for a majority of its people.  
The Party-State carries a strong developmentalist discourse  
and its members position themselves as ‘state-craft thinkers’, 
who have to, and can, turn the country from a ‘latecomer  
state’ into an ‘advanced country’, by making adjustments 
inspired by exogenous Western or Asian models.16 But growth 
has slowed down and inequalities are increasing, especially  
in urban contexts, leading many to question the legitimacy  
of the ‘socialist and communist’ Regime. 
So far, pragmatism and flexibility have been key to  
mitigate shocks and react to emerging demands, internal  
or external, from the local ‘civil society’ or from the private 
sector. The Party-State has demonstrated its ability to adapt 
and react subtly by postponing unpopular or sensitive reforms, 
by co-opting potential sources of opposition, by adopting  
new rules or by taking a step back from urban or peri-urban 
projects that provoke local conflicts. 
Beyond the ‘black box’
Walking through the city, from the coﬀee shop on the  
corner of the street, past private homes, oﬃcial oﬃces, city 
departments and police stations, our findings result from 
extensive fieldwork, exploring urban and peri-urban areas, 
engaging with people, and producing a collective eﬀort  
to circulate information and perspectives. 
Beyond the documentation of Vietnamese urban mutations 
in their various forms, this Focus also wants to oﬀer a renewed 
perspective on urban studies’ tools, from the specific context  
of Vietnam today. Following the track of the Southern Turn,17 we 
have strived to tackle the inadequacy of the Western conceptual 
framework in urban studies. Applied out of its context, this 
hegemonical toolbox of globalized urbanism has become a 
‘black box’,18 invisibilising the specificities of Vietnamese cities. 
We therefore explore the possibility of transcending ‘the West 
and the Rest’ categorisation, inherited from colonial times. 
Indeed, Vietnamese cities undergo combined forms of rigid 
categorisation: economically speaking, they are ‘emerging  
cities’, that is to say threatening for European and North 
American countries;19 from a socio-spatial perspective, they 
are ‘Southern’ and ‘developing’ cities;20 and politically they 
are considered to be ‘opening-up’, designated with the prefix 
‘post’, to indicate both the end of colonialism and socialism.  
For all these reasons, the recurring discourse of ‘transition’  
is dominant in the analyses of the production of contemporary 
Vietnamese cities.21 
This Focus intends to show how the intersectionality of 
Vietnamese cities is fertile ground for rethinking the position, 
methods and concepts of the researcher – especially when he 
or she is not Vietnamese. The making of this project was there-
fore thought to disrupt the ‘black box’. As a group, we were 
particularly keen on a symmetrical research practice in a post-
colonial perspective. This involves decentring the researcher’s 
gaze to balance the power plays that govern the production 
of knowledge. We therefore sought to work with – rather than 
instead of – Vietnamese researchers. To do that, we functioned 
either in pairs (comprising both a French and a Vietnamese 
researcher) or we put French and Vietnamese perspectives, 
on objects such as heritages and rituals, side by side. This 
innovative working process allowed for a continued presence 
in the field over many years, for shared fieldwork, contradictory 
readings of the findings, and for co-writing processes. We 
were therefore able to overcome challenging practical issues 
such as the scarcity of statistical data, accessibility of sensitive 
places and stakeholders, and matters of understanding local 
narratives, thus contributing to a comprehensive approach  
to the city, and articulating macro and micro scale analyses.
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Once low, dense and organic  
cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC) are now engaged in  
a steady-paced verticalisation 
process, especially in the new 
urbanised areas flourishing  
at their edges (khu đô thị mới).  
But beyond iconic new urban 
projects and glittering business 
districts, the everyday city  
production still takes place  
in the interior of their specific  
urban pattern, namely their  
alleyway neighbourhoods. 
Marie Gibert and Pham Thái So’n
Above:  
An alleyway in  
HCMC (district 3)  
in the morning 
(photo by Marie 
Gibert).
Narrow lane, small street, 
my home is there
In my dreams,  
I still remember this … 1
THESE ANCIENT NEIGHBOURHOODS are characterised by the 
‘smallness’ of their plot division and by the very high density 
of population they foster (more than 80.000 inhabitants/km2 
in some central areas of HCMC; in district 10 for instance). 
Although lacking oﬃcial recognition from the urban authori-
ties, the urban network of alleyways still houses about 85% of 
city dwellers in HCMC, and 88% in Hanoi.2 As such, it remains 
an important ingredient of the Vietnamese urban identity. 
Reading the contemporary production of metropolitan spaces 
through this lens provides insights not only into the evolution 
of the inherited spatial apparatus, but also into the social and 
political dimensions of the urbanity. It allows one to embrace 
the ethnographical turn in metropolitan studies that Ananya 
Roy and Aiwha Ong call for, in order to fully integrate  
“the diversity of urban dreams, project and practices […]  
in emerging world regions” in the field of urban theory.3
Hanoi’s alleyways: the evidence of a rural palimpsest
The widespread existence and the typical small width of 
alleyways in Hanoi are not an accidental phenomenon; they  
are the historical result of the urban development process. 
Most of Hanoi’s alleyways have been developing based on  
the spatial structure of ancient rural villages (làng), after some 
structural and dimensional restoration. The main alleyways 
were established from the ancient road pattern leading to 
the village hamlets (thôn): the pathway between ancient rice 
fields or along the edge of large ponds, once existing almost 
everywhere in ancient villages. The smallest alleys were  
created more recently, during the densification process of 
urban villages; either through organisational subdivisions,  
or through the auto-division of original private land.4
In the beginning of the 1990s, Hanoi’s local authorities 
distributed land – including vacant lots, lakes, ponds and  
rice fields – surrounding the city centre among public groups.  
The receiving organisations then divided these areas into 
several single plots of 30-40m2 and allocated them to their 
staﬀ. The small alleyways were designed as straight passages, 
of approximately 2-2.5m wide, between the plots of land.  
The second mechanism mentioned above is the common  
phenomenon of auto-division of private land in urbanised 
villages surrounding the city. With the construction of new 
homes, or the need for familial financial resources (garnered 
through selling land), original land owners divide their garden, 
court or pond into many small plots of 30-50m2, leaving  
small passages of only 1-1.5m wide. Such alleys can be winding 
or straight, depending on the number of times a plot has been 
divided, and the division method of subsequent owners. 
The mechanisms of alleyway development, together  
with the city-wide phenomenon of illegal encroachments by  
house construction, explain the extremely narrow width of  
the alleys. In Hanoi, 90% of the alleys are less than 4m wide,  
with a significant disparity among the diﬀerent urban areas:  
the further from the city centre, the larger the alleyways. 
 As a result, most alleys are inaccessible to cars.
HCMC’s alleyways: the pragmatism of city dwellers  
during uncertain historical times
In HCMC, the very dense network of alleyways was born  
mainly out of the city dwellers’ pragmatism during uncertain 
times. Only the colonial grid-pattern covering district 1,  
a part of district 3, and the historical structure of the Chinese 
neighbourhood of Chợ Lớn, at the West of district 5, were 
planned and calibrated during the 19th century. At that period 
the street networks were considered to be the matrix of the 
urbanisation process. But beyond the production of these 
historical neighbourhoods, urban growth took place following 
a spontaneous and linear logic, first guided by the main  
trading axes, and later by a process of densification.5
The further we get from these structuring main streets, the 
more random the alleyway grid becomes, revealing the historical 
interweaving between the planned and the spontaneous in 
HCMC’s urban production. The diﬀerent morphological patterns 
of the alleyways answered the variety of local situations: like a 
palimpsest, their spatial organisation often reveals the ancient 
frame of rural paths, paddy fields or embankment systems,  
that structured the territory many decades ago. As a result, 
HCMC’s urban structure is notably based on the juxtaposition  
of diﬀerent composite urban fabrics. 
Each alleyway benefits from strong interactions with its 
adjacent plots of lands. This spatial apparatus constitutes the 
basic unit of the urban matrix. The heart of this apparatus 
comprises the ‘shop house’, today often reinterpreted as the 
‘tube-house’ (nhà ống). Its shape is rectangular, very narrow 
and deep (around 3-4m wide and 15-25m deep), perpendicular 
to the street, onto which it opens directly (on one side only), 
and it occupies the entire plot of land. The high prevalence of 
this urban form helps to explain the high density that HCMC 
fosters, despite its low morphological profile. 
Both in Hanoi and HCMC, low-rise urban fabric allows for 
direct street access to a maximum of residents. Indeed, trading 
functions have historically driven the format of urban housing 
in Vietnam. Alleyways directly connected to commercial 
streets are the most valued. Furthermore, within this urban 
texture, the diﬀerent blocks and neighbourhoods are not 
structured around any central plaza. The idea of centrality is 
linearly embodied by the main alleyway, which constitutes the 
backbone of the local structure and which is the most socially 
and commercially dynamic place in the neighbourhood.  
In Vietnamese spatial practices, the built environment itself is 
structured by and according to the street: it is the distance to 
the street that orders the layout and the functions associated 
with each room in the house, through a succession of ranked 
thresholds. The entrance room, which opens directly onto the 
street, constitutes the pivot of this spatial apparatus: it allows 
an eﬃcient interface between public and private, commercial 
and domestic. Thus, Vietnamese alleyways oﬀer a relevant 
example of an integrated urban apparatus, where interrelations 
between the form of places and their practices are obvious. 
Alleyway households as self-organised communities 
Alleyway neighbourhoods are divided into several resident 
groups (tổ dân phố) of 50-100 persons. Each group is led by  
a head person, who represents the neighbourhood at the 
ward level. The groups organise monthly meetings, in which 
they inform residents of administrative news, discuss local 
policies, and mediate household conflicts. Thus, alleyway 
households proactively participate in the management  
of their daily lives and the development of their surrounding 
space and landscape. 
A good example of the willingness of urban residents 
to participate in the production of their space is the local 
project that (re)constructed alley pavements and underground 
sewers. To carry out the project, each household contributed 
to the budget; so too did the Ward People’s Committee, in 
accordance with the principle Nhà nước và nhân dân cùng làm 
[the state and people work together]. Resident groups relied 
on their ‘head person’ to supervise the work, but each resident 
also kept an eye on work done in front of their own home.  
Most residents were satisfied with the outcome and the quality 
of work; more so than with projects that are totally financed by 
the public sector, in which cases they do not have any right of 
supervision or participation. Another example of urban  
A view from Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City alleyway neighbourhoods
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Hanoi’s alleyway 
neighborhoods 
facing the building  
of Ring Road No1  
(Ô Cho.ʼ  DÙa and 
Xã Đàn sections) 
between 2005 
(above) and 2015 
(below). Courtesy 
Google Earth.
self-management can be found in a small alley on Giải Phóng 
street in Hanoi. Residents were unhappy with their very narrow 
alley (only 1.2m), and so decided to expand its width to 2m  
by all contributing a part of their private land.
These examples confirm that urban residents are not  
passive actors in the city production, but active participants  
in urban morphology, the evolution of technical services and 
the creation of everyday public space. Daily life in the alleyways 
illustrates very well the traditional Vietnamese saying bán anh 
em xa mua láng giềng gần [selling far brothers and buying near 
neighbours]. The intimate interactions among alley residents 
create a strong sense of community and a shared memory, as 
Le Vinh describes in his famous song “Hanoi and me”, quoted  
at the top of this article.
Alleyways as vibrant public spaces 
A detour via a semantics study allows for a better understand-
ing of the particular concept of the street within Vietnamese 
culture. The Vietnamese language provides a categorisation 
of the world characterised by the use of classifiers for nouns, 
according to whether they are living things (con) or inanimate 
objects (cái). Interestingly, the common word for ‘street’ is con 
đường and not cái đường. In Vietnamese, the street is perceived 
as an active being and a ‘circulated space’, shaped by the 
diﬀerent types of traﬃc flows that go through it everyday.  
This notion acknowledges that social practices contribute to 
the street’s identity and take part in its metamorphoses. 
Moreover, streets are considered to be resources  
intuitively used to meet various needs. Not only is the alleyway 
a place of business, but residents also treat their doorstep  
and street as a natural extension of their own home.6  
As a result, various domestic activities, such as cooking,  
doing one’s laundry, installing ornamental plants or burning 
votive objects, take place in the alleyways of Hanoi and 
HCMC. Trading on the street or on one’s doorstep has also 
been one of the most shared ways to earn a living in post-
reform Vietnam, a time at which many people lost their state 
sector positions. The renewal of the private sector in the 
Vietnamese economy is thus strongly characterised by small 
businesses. The capacity alleyways have to welcome such  
a diversity of activities can be explained through a temporal 
analysis: the rotation of each type of activity during the day 
allows for increased access to the street for a larger number  
of urban dwellers.
Beyond the antagonism of the public/private duo inherited 
from the Western conception of urban spaces, Vietnamese 
alleyways oﬀer the richness of the buﬀer zone of its intermediate 
semi-public spaces, at the interface of the tube-house and the 
street. In Vietnam, the level of publicness of a space varies  
depending on the time of day, and day of year. This remark 
invites us to re-think the notion of public space from the per- 
spective of Hanoi and HCMC alleyways, in order to fully integrate 
the urban practices and conceptualisations of the global South  
in the field of urban theory.7 The anthropological exploration  
of the daily functioning of ordinary alleyways also provides an 
invitation to acknowledge the social value of ephemeral public 
spaces, which are constantly renewed by residents’ uses and 
interchanges. These fluid and shifting spaces allow for a great 
reversibility in urban functions and illustrate the idea of the 
street as a ‘capital for experimentation’ and the fruit of a social 
agreement continuously renewed over time, which allows both 
for the permanence of a spatial form and the modification of  
its parallel uses.8
Alleyways in the course of the metropolisation process: 
current challenges and ongoing mutations 
In the course of metropolisation, the alleyways of Hanoi and 
HCMC tend to more and more be considered as necessary 
connectors within larger road systems.9 This trend leads to  
a progressive disconnect between circulatory and residential 
functions, which used to be the dominant frame of the 
Vietnamese urban fabric.
After decades of laissez-faire regarding the city growth, the 
metropolitan authorities have come up with new priorities, be-
ginning with the need for traﬃc fluidity, which reveals the rise 
in power of a neo-functionalism perspective concerning urban 
planning in Vietnam today. Beyond this concern, the inherited 
organic system of the alleyways is accused of challenging urban 
safety, fire risk for instance. These are the two main oﬃcial 
arguments to justify the necessity of a vast alleyway enlarge-
ment programme in both cities. But it is easy to decipher other 
unoﬃcial – but at least as powerful – reasons for challenging 
the low-rise urban pattern of alleyway neighbourhoods; think 
for example of the hygienist’s vision of a modern city. 
The metropolisation process comes hand-in-hand with a 
tremendous increase in demand for land and land prices during 
the last decade. Within urban contexts, where the price of 
land is, among other variables, linked to the accessibility of 
the street, enlarging an alleyway both maximises the value of 
the plot and allows residents to build higher. Thus, increasing 
the land’s profitability is undeniably one of the most powerful 
engines of urban renewal of the vernacular neighbourhoods. 
And so is the urban authorities’ will to control and regulate 
the daily practices of the urban population. The figure of the 
street seller is among the most threatened. Despite his central 
place in the everyday nature of the urban fabric, his presence  
is more and more perceived as contrary to the ‘worlding’  
ambitions of Hanoi and HCMC. At the interface of network  
and territory, both fixed and on the move, the street seller  
is an interesting pivot of the street socio-spatial apparatus  
in Vietnam. Yet the street seller tends to be evicted in favour  
of traﬃc. In this context, there is a growing convergence of 
views between the urban authorities and the urban middle 
class owners. This convergence can be explained by the grow-
ing worry of middleclass members to protect and mark out the 
boundaries of their newly acquired properties by promoting  
a clearer distinction between public and private urban spaces. 
The urban authorities oﬃcially support this growing distinction, 
by promoting the intended edification of what is called a 
‘civilised and modern’ city (đô thị văn minh, hiện đại). Oﬃcial 
poster campaigns urge urban dwellers to follow new urban 
rules of civilisation, such as no trade on the sidewalk, in order 
to build ‘cultural neighbourhoods’ (khu phố văn hóa). 
Furthermore, the current evolution of each neighbourhood 
depends greatly on its relationship with the emerging and 
renewed ‘metropolitan centralities’. In HCMC, wards 22 of Bình 
Thạnh district and 13 of Phú Nhuận district are among the most 
integrated in the oﬃcial renewal projects. Interestingly, despite 
their advanced level of metropolisation, these two wards show 
diﬀerent trends as far as alleyways are concerned. Most alley-
ways of ward 13 in Phú Nhuận have been enlarged and renewed 
over the past five years, whilst those in ward 22 in Bình Thạnh 
district will soon be replaced by new vertical urban forms, along 
rescaled transport infrastructures. These infrastructures are 
already abruptly cutting up the ancient urban fabric, reflecting 
perfectly a common eﬀect of ‘project-based urbanism’.
The alleyway, a matter of function
Hanoi and HCMC street patterns are characterised by an 
endless network of alleyways. These alleyway neighbourhoods 
have already shown a great capacity for transformation over 
the past decades, especially through the various creative 
interventions by residents, who make full use of the alleyways 
on an everyday basis. Alleyways remain core elements of the 
urban identity and are still the most common form of public 
space, even though current infrastructure developments are 
leading to new, very distinct, articulations between public  
and private spaces, which were once very blurred categories  
in the Vietnamese urban context.
The organic growth of the urban and social network 
appears to be challenged today. Despite its modest local 
ambitions, the current project of alleyway enlargement 
operates within a broader development of infrastructure by 
the metropolitan authorities. In the current metropolisation 
process, movement is privileged above the production of 
local territories. In this perspective, the street is envisioned  
as a single-function urban object, entirely dedicated to  
transit traﬃc, while it used to be highly multifunctional. 
Marie Gibert is a postdoctoral research fellow  
at the Asia Research Institute (ARI) in Singapore. 
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As a consequence of their economic take-oﬀ and rapid urbanisation, the two 
major Vietnamese metropolises, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), saw  
a tremendous increase of private vehicles (motorcycles and then cars) in their 
streets, leading today to severe traﬃc congestion. To address this critical issue,  
the cities have two responses. On the one hand, they build new roads to satisfy 
the emerging middleclass that can aﬀord private vehicles. On the other hand, 
they attempt to modernise public transit networks, especially by developing large  
scale mass rapid transit systems. While the latter is considered an appropriate 
response to solve urban problems (e.g., traﬃc congestion, atmospheric pollution, 
and urban sprawl), the local authorities are facing various constraints that could 
jeopardise the construction of the expected public transit facilities. Hence the 
transportation sector provides another perspective to the challenges of the  
metropolisation process in both Hanoi and HCMC.
Clément Musil & Vuong Khánh Toàn
Below left:  
Hanoi daily traﬃc 
jams (photograph 
by author).
Below right:  
Ho Chi Minh City 
metro line No.1 
under construction  
(photograph by 
Clément Musil. 
IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME since electric tramways were  
carrying people in Hanoi and HCMC’s streets. This urban 
snapshot actually belongs to two diﬀerent past periods.  
The Northern metropolis operated its tramway network 
until the early 1990s. Decades after the American bombing 
campaigns that heavily damaged Hanoi’s transport infrastruc-
tures, the tramway was finally dismantled because of a lack of 
financial resources to maintain it. In the Southern metropolis, 
that back then was called Saigon and was the capital of the 
Republic of South Vietnam, the tramway only ran until the 
mid-1950s. The then president of South Vietnam, Ngô Đình 
Diê.m, decided in the name of modernity to remove the trams 
to make room for imported cars as well as scooters and 
motorbikes.1 Despite diﬀerent trajectories regarding urban 
transportation, both cities do not yet have other collective 
transit services (apart from bus lines); while today private 
vehicles increasingly clog the cities arterials. 
The ongoing urban transport transition
Due to a rapid economic development that has driven the 
country since the mid-1980s, and its positive consequences 
for the population, city dwellers started to have the financial 
resources to drop bicycles and abandon ineﬃcient public  
bus services in exchange for individual motorbikes. Because 
this transport mode proved to be very compatible with  
the network of narrow alleyways in the two cities, Hanoi  
and HCMC quickly became two so-called ‘motorcycle  
dependent cities’, in the same way as other South-East  
Asian metropolises.2 As a result, in 2015, the capital city  
had nearly 5 million registered motorbikes for an estimated 
population of 7 million; while the Southern metropolis  
counted more than 8 million inhabitants with 6.5 million 
registered motorbikes.3 
Although the motorbike modal share is on average  
80% (and less than 10% for public transit) in both cities, the  
dependency is evident today with inhabitants merging with 
their motorbikes like Centaurs with their horses, on a never-end-
ing commute through the city. Whereas motorbikes dominate 
the streets, cars emerge and appear as a strong competitor in 
terms of desirability, status and scarce road space. Even though 
the number of cars can still be considered low,4 it is rising by 
more than 10% every year in both cities. 
The increase of vehicles has at least two most undesirable, 
yet well known, consequences: congestion and pollution. 
Congestion leads to an annual shortfall of USD 1.2 billion for  
the economic stakeholders in HCMC.5 In an eﬀort to tackle 
congestion-related problems, to improve the environmental 
quality for city residents, and to cope with climate change-
related adverse eﬀects, the Government plans to fill the  
urban transport infrastructure gap by carrying out two sets  
of measures in each city. The strategy aims at expanding the 
existing road network (widening major axes, building ring roads, 
elevated highways and flyovers) on the one hand, and building 
extensive mass transit systems composed of metro lines and  
bus rapid transit corridors on the other. Urban transport is  
thus transitioning from being purely individual, to a transport 
system that provides public transit as an alternative.
The expected urban transport transition
Stimulated by vibrant economic growth (more than 8% on average 
this last decade) and by a rapid increase in population (between 
3-3.5% since 2009), Hanoi and HCMC recently adopted ambitious 
public transit development plans. The ‘Capital City Master 
Plan to 2030 and Vision to 2050’, approved in 2011, foresees 
building eight metro lines (a total of 331 km), three monorail 
lines, plus nine express bus routes. In the south, HCMC adjusted 
its transport plan in 2013, which suggested that by 2030, the city 
would be equipped with eight metro lines, plus one tramway and 
two monorail lines, for a total of 216 km (see map 1) and will count 
six bus rapid transit corridors that bring an additional 100 km of 
public transit. The objective set out for both cities is a modal share 
of public transport reaching 25% of city travel by 2020.
However, between what the plans target and what is being 
realised today, there is a significant gap. Hanoi has two metro 
lines under construction (No.3 and 2A, of 12.5 km and 13 km 
respectively), a 15 km bus rapid transit corridor, and two other 
metro lines (No.1 and 2) in the detailed design phase. HCMC is 
building its first metro line (No.1) of 20 km, and line No.2 plus 
a section of line No.5, with the first bus rapid transit corridor 
barely in the detailed design phase. According to the Ministry 
of Transport, the first mass rapid transit that will run in Vietnam 
should be metro line No.2A in Hanoi; for which the opening 
ceremony is expected by the end of 2016 – though all projects 
commonly suﬀer critical delays and significant cost overruns.6 
Even if construction of these public transit systems is slow, 
the process has been triggered. Consequently, the urban 
landscape in both cities will soon radically change. The new 
infrastructures will be built mainly with viaduct sections, 
and underground sections applied in high density areas 
only. Regarding their spatial orientation, these facilities will 
connect the inner city cores to their suburbs, where the local 
governments plan to develop satellite cities and new urban 
areas. These facilities will also bring ambitious and large-scale 
estate developments such as high-rise oﬃces, housing, and 
shopping malls.
These urban development and renewal patterns are not 
unfamiliar in South-East Asia. In the era of globalisation, the 
construction of these new transportation systems confirms 
that the urbanisation process in Vietnam joins the ‘single urban 
discourse’.7 This trend is also reinforced by the involvement of 
powerful private domestic real estate developers (e.g., Vingroup, 
Bitexco, Dai Quang Minh) who are investing in areas surrounding 
future metro stations and who manage to bypass the rigid 
public planning process.8 Both the transportation network and 
property development are features of ‘urban convergence’ 
observed since the late 1990s in the South-East Asian region. 
Today Vietnam is definitively part of this tendency with new 
mega-infrastructure projects underway. However, these projects 
are functioning under several constraints that could jeopardise 
the development of the expected mass public transit systems.
Constraints to the development of cities’ public  
transit systems
Apart from technical issues that delay the construction of the 
metro lines and bus rapid transit corridors, the final realisation  
of the overall transport plans are challenged by various  
additional obstacles in both cities, namely financial issues  
and land acquisition diﬃculties. 
Although the Vietnamese Government aims to develop 
modern public transit systems, the authorities face a severe 
lack of financial and technical resources. The authorities 
mainly lean on Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) 
provided by international donors, and secondarily on private 
sector capital. However, because public transit projects are 
today both costly and sophisticated,9 and it is uncertain 
whether they will generate any profit (all over the world public 
transit systems are mainly in deficit and subsidised), ODA 
mostly co-funds these initiatives. The Government contrib-
utes up to 20% of the construction costs of each project.
Today the situation seems to be troublesome and fragmented. 
Among all the projects that are under construction and in 
the detailed design stage (i.e., 9 in total), there are 9 diﬀerent 
international donors involved. The Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) co-funds metro lines No.1 and 2 in 
Hanoi and No.1 in Ho Chi Minh City; the Chinese Government 
finances one line in Hanoi (No.2A); the French Government and 
its cooperation agency (Agence Française de Développement) 
teamed up with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) to co-fund metro line No.3  
The challenge of building mass rapid transit systems
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Map: Development 
of Ho Chi Minh 
City public transit 
system for 2020-2030 
(Courtesy of PADDI).
To cope with this challenge, the cities do have  
ambitious plans. But because of lacking financial resources 
and the sophistication of planned facilities like the metro 
lines, the future of the metropolitan public transit systems 
depends on foreign financial technology and aid. Challenges 
in land acquisition, tardy resettlement procedures, and 
land disputes have slowed down the completion of works. 
Furthermore, issues in governance of such on-going  
projects have tested the authorities. They are now pushed  
to design a suitable institutional architecture to ensure  
that facilities under construction may later function  
as a unique system.
Given these constraints, it is doubtful that urban  
public transit systems will be built faster than the road  
networks, in spite of the pledged construction of the first 
metro lines in Hanoi and HCMC. Regarding the metropolitan 
road network evolution in both cities, the local governments 
have technical know-how at their disposal without being 
reliant on foreign technology. They are also able to raise  
funds through partnerships involving the private sector  
based on proven and successful mechanisms. Moreover, 
a growing slice of the population that can aﬀord a car will 
expect the development of road networks. The challenge  
that the authorities face does not only concern financial  
and technical aspects, but also its capacity to convince the 
citizens that public transport, instead of private vehicles,  
is the future of a modern metropolis.
Clément Musil is associate researcher to IPRAUS (France)  
and PADDI (Vietnam) and holds a PhD. in Regional and  
City Planning;
Vu ong Khánh Toàn is an architect, urbanist and lecturer  
of the Hanoi Architecture University (Vietnam).
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in Hanoi; the German and Spanish Governments also joined  
the ADB and the EIB to co-fund two metro lines in Ho Chi Minh 
City (No.2 and 5); and the World Bank grants loans to build  
the first bus rapid transit corridors in both cities. Despite this 
multitude of donors, the financing of numerous additional 
planned projects still requires confirmation, and although  
other donors, such as South Korean bilateral cooperation,  
as well as private investors have expressed certain interest, 
little discussion has been concluded and uncertainty remains.
While the Government is in need of financial assistance, 
ODA donors are in a comfortable situation to oﬀer, and also to 
compete against one another. This is explained by the benefits 
that each ODA supplier can gain in granting loans to Vietnam. 
In fact, each donor imposes particular conditions for grant-
ing their loan. The Japanese assistance, which has the most 
attractive financial oﬀer, is mainly characterised by a ‘tied’ 
financial aid. This means that the loan is conditioned by the use 
of Japanese technology and expertise. On the other hand, for 
facilities in which multilateral donors are involved, the financial 
aid is considered to be ‘untied’. The development banks allow 
open tenders for which both foreign and local contractors can 
submit their bids. However, these donors impose other strict 
requirements such as respect for ethical, social and environ-
mental rules when implementing the project. The Vietnamese 
Government has then to meet conditions like minimising the 
project’s adverse eﬀects on the environment and population, 
particularly when resettlement is required. 
Diversified financing sources are certainly an advantage 
to the cities, helping them with access to required funds for 
project implementation. In return, however, these loans weigh 
heavily on the country’s debt and the authorities are made to 
comply with each donor’s conditions.10 They are often forced to 
depend on various foreign techniques and technologies, which 
may not be totally compatible with each other. Furthermore, 
diversification of financing parties has the eﬀect of partitioning 
the projects. This approach could be counterproductive, as the 
goal is that all public transport facilities form a unified system 
in order to challenge private vehicles.
In addition to the financial aspect, access to land has been 
a major obstacle in every urban transport project initiated so 
far in Vietnam. Problems in accessing land increase the overall 
costs and delay the completion of the works. Expropriation, 
compensation and resettlement procedures are the most 
diﬃcult stages in the project implementation. Unlike road 
building projects, the first studies on metro and bus rapid 
transit corridors seemed to have little impact on the land  
(as was the city authorities’ understanding). Indeed, metro  
lines are built oﬀ-ground and appear to be less land-consuming. 
As for bus corridors, they are integrated in enlarged road 
arteries and thus do not directly need land acquisition. 
However, since works started in Hanoi and HCMC, the 
land issue has re-emerged as a major concern. Whereas the 
need for land acquisition is limited, resettlement is inevitable, 
especially for works on train depots, access to stations, roads 
and other network deviations, installation of ventilation shafts 
and safety systems in underground sections. For instance, in 
the case of metro line No.2 in HCMC, more than 22 hectares 
of land located in urban districts are to be acquired and 400 
households will be relocated and compensated, with the total 
cost estimated at USD 115 million. With such conditions, the 
local governments face two major challenges when building 
other public transit facilities: the establishment of land reserves 
and the management of resettlement procedures.
Although cities in Vietnam do not have the ‘urban  
pre-emption right’ to establish land reserves, both cities do 
have a Land Development Centre. This kind of public body 
is in charge of acquiring plots and compensating land users. 
However, they have had little room to operate so far since 
they have limited financial resources and land use planning is 
unclear. In this context, those Centres are in an unfavourable 
position to establish land reserves and to provide plots for 
building the expected infrastructures. Moreover, the land 
located around the future metro stations, where high land 
value increase is predicted, has already been acquired,  
notably by well-informed property developers.
Resettlement procedures related to public transport 
infrastructures pose another problem for the authorities. 
Whilst public transport projects are developed in the name of 
public interest, most of the land users who are aﬀected by the 
projects are reluctant to transfer their rights to the administra-
tion.11 Though land users do not oppose the legitimacy of the 
operation, they contest the amount of proposed compensation. 
Actually, land prices are often undervalued, while both cities 
periodically experience uncontrolled land price increasing.12 
Furthermore, from the first land assessment until the govern-
ment’s request for site clearance, which may take several years, 
land prices may have surged, causing fresh disagreements with 
disaﬀected households. Moreover, opposition is stronger and 
more violent with households who do not have regulated land 
use rights. The administration estimates that the latter are only 
compensated for their lost property but not for the land, and the 
compensation amount for the building is often ridiculously low 
compared to the amount paid for the land. Hence, the progress 
of urban transport projects poses a critical issue of equity of 
households to administrative procedures, and questions the 
transparency of resettlement regulations.
The future of public transit depends on pragmatic policies
Due to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City’s rapid urbanisation, 
building modern mass transit systems is a priority to ensure 
sustainable and liveable urban development in the coming 
decades. To break with current practices of city travel mainly  
by motorbikes, the Government has no option but to invent 
a new way of mobility based on fast, eﬃcient and attractive 
public transport, ensuring that commuting is viable across  
the entire metropolitan areas.
The production of the city: reshaping state-society relation
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The Vietnamese Party-State, characterised by its communist aﬃliation,  
enduring centralisation and lasting authoritarianism is nevertheless evolving.  
The city production and reproduction mechanisms actively contribute to  
reshaping State-Society relations and local political structures.
Juliette Segard
Above: Area of Nam 
Trung Yen, a new 
urban zone on the 
outskirts of Hanoi 
(Courtesy of François 
Carlet-Soulages/
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The imposition of a project or unfavourable policy 
contributes to ad hoc coalitions of opposition that can bring 
together various stakeholders: the village as a whole, only a few 
households, the hamlets adjacent to the future project, local 
authorities, mass organisations, head of hamlet, local com-
munist party members, etc. Of course, on the decision makers’ 
and promoters’ side the goal is to prevent the formation  
of these collectives and to fragment the front, using threats, 
and moral or financial incentives to ‘surrender’ first.
Local authorities, torn by their dual mandate and account-
ability – as representatives of their constituencies and as the 
agents of the State – flip from one side to the other depending 
on leaders’ personality, situation, grading of the project on 
the injustice scale or pressure put on them. Whereas in some 
villages they can be the ‘intermediary’ negotiating and even 
promoting a project, in others they can lead the opposition or 
advocate for adjustments. The palette of resistance ‘tools’ also 
varies from one conflict to another; similar to Scott’s “everyday 
forms of resistance”, it ranges from propagating rumours to 
lodging a formal complaint to the higher levels of authorities.3 
The last resort is to physically and vocally confront a project, 
with very strong risks of being beaten or jailed.
These actions need to be contextualised in a movement  
of the liberalisation of association rights, as long as they are not 
subversive of or challenging to the Party’s interests. Far from 
democracy, freedom of speech and association, this never-
theless opens new ways of creating groups that fall outside the 
traditional mobilisation structures, i.e., mass organisations.4 
Both NGOs and leisure associations, which can be spaces of 
exchange, debate and awareness raising, are multiplying in size 
and number. Some of these groups actually advocate for change, 
in policies or practices, while others are much more local, yet  
still in favour of helping to build a community.
The Regime pragmatism: containing the crises
The Regime, while powerful and authoritarian, is also well 
aware of people’s opinions and is careful to use the proper 
amount of repression on the one hand and leniency on the 
other, to take divergences of opinion into account or to limit 
their expression.5 The production of the city and planning 
regulations are good examples of the iterative process, 
between State and Society, of designing and adapting the law 
and even institutions, so that the Party-State is not threatened. 
Adjustment to reality and pragmatism are key, and in that 
sense the Regime and its powers are well suited to quickly 
reacting and adapting.
For instance, while division and coercion manoeuvres  
can sometimes succeed, especially when public forces are 
involved, villagers’ coalitions can also manage to halt a project, 
challenge it and, in any case, participate in a larger movement 
that influences law-making, rules, procedures. Bypassing  
traditional structures of ‘representation’, their arguments 
emerge in the public realm. Newspapers, blogs or oral 
transmission contribute to raising awareness on planning and 
land-related conflicts: people know what happened in other 
villages and methods of resisting are spreading through the 
peri-urban areas. At the same time, people are better informed 
of rules and rights; in some urban districts citizens have 
utilised the justice department and have started legal trials. 
Nevertheless, even if there is a clear accumulation of resistance 
and ‘hot-spots’, it would be misleading to interpret this as  
the creation of a common front or a wider social and political 
movement.6 Conflicts are predominantly local, contingent  
with local aﬀairs and rarely go beyond that. 
However, in recent years in the Red River Delta, for  
instance, examples of shifts in public policies or implementa-
tion decisions have been numerous. Following the 2008 change 
of administrative and territorial boundaries of the capital, the 
city’s authorities – under central government – decided to 
suspend most investment and construction licences, oﬃcially 
in order to check their relevance for the Master Plan. But it 
was also a way to benefit more directly from the extension of 
Hanoi, both politically and economically, and to ‘freeze’ and 
then cancel some projects that triggered popular resistance.7 
This cut-down reflected the multiplication of projects that 
didn’t respond to any needs and which only revealed district 
/province entrepreneurial positioning or speculation.
Nowadays, reconversion of uses and revocation of licences 
for industrial parks that have been announced by the Prime 
Minister show the central authority’s pragmatism: withdraw 
support to projects, sometimes locally selected, that are 
neither justifiable nor eﬃcient and that may or have caused 
local resistance. Institutional and legal frameworks are 
also evolving by partly taking into account citizens’ claims, 
nationwide. For instance, following the 1997 rural uprisings 
in Thái Bình, Thanh Hóa and ĐÔng Nai, which were linked to 
corruption and collusion, the Grassroots Democracy Decree 
was adopted, introducing new information, control and 
participation procedures to take local decisions. More recently, 
the revised Land Law was adopted and entered into force in 
2014. Some articles clearly address opacity and haziness of 
procedures; e.g., while the payment of compensation is set to 
take place 30 days after the recovery of land, councils need to 
be implemented by the president of the People’s Committee 
at the provincial and communal levels, in order to evaluate the 
local circumstances and suggest compensations accordingly.
Obviously, there is a major disconnect between the  
legislative framework and its implementation on the ground, 
and these laws or decrees are issued to a great extent in order 
to present a more democratic and voluntaristic face to the 
public opinion, but also to the international community and  
the private sector, even if it is not backed by strict enforce-
ment. Nevertheless, the legislation and the administration 
evolve, so does the Regime, and citizens sometimes actively 
contribute to these dynamics.
Control over natural resources and urban planning 
question both structures and individuals, public authorities 
and citizens: how they position themselves, what to protect, 
which limits to impose, what matters. Production or renova-
tion of cities challenge power and in Vietnam’s case it actually 
contributes to ‘negotiating’ the Regime’s authoritarianism, 
as a growing number of citizens rally to defend either their 
livelihoods and interests, or the common good.8
Juliette Segard holds a PhD in Geography (University 
Paris Ouest) and works as a consultant in International 
Cooperation and Development.
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URBANISATION IN VIETNAM, both in its nature and  
modalities, can be seen as ‘colonising’ peri-urban and rural 
areas, as local stakeholders (from the public authorities  
to the inhabitants) are excluded from the planning and 
decision-making processes. This sprawl takes place without 
fully considering the existing situation, by dismantling 
territories and progressively imposing a new political and 
administrative order. 
Urbanisation is presented as an inevitable step for the 
modernisation and the industrialisation of the country. The 
urban forms produced reflect urban utopia mainstreamed in 
many oﬃcial discourses: cities have to be modern [hiện đại] 
and have to symbolise the power of the Nation. Unplanned 
and endogenous urbanisation doesn’t fit these categories 
whereas international ‘products’, from shopping malls  
to condominiums, are desirable emblems of Vietnam’s 
worldwide integration.
More pragmatically, the dynamics and ways of extension 
allow both personal and structural accumulation of wealth 
for the established powers as well as for the nouveaux riches. 
Considering the ‘land fever’ and on-going speculation, 
public-private growth coalitions are progressively shaped, 
between public authorities and private (domestic or foreign) 
entrepreneurs.
The scale and pace of projects have increased  
tremendously in certain regions, as in the Red River Delta,1 
bringing urbanisation to an all new level, especially since 
infrastructures have been developed and migration rules 
loosened, allowing people to move more easily. For instance, 
both urban-dwellers and rural migrants resettle in peri-urban 
areas, the latter to fill unqualified and low-paid positions in 
industrial zones or to work in the construction sector. Urban 
fringes are thus profoundly transformed by these material, 
demographical and social evolutions, which hybridise  
territories and communities.
But the situation is not that one dimensional, and the  
city production or reproduction mechanisms actually con-
tribute to reshaping State-Society relations and local political 
structures. Dynamics of urbanisation renew tensions, create 
new tensions or even cause uproars. The popular resistance is 
multi-shaped and has various roots: it goes from protecting 
cultural heritage or natural resources at the provincial-scale, 
to defending a few hectares of agricultural land in a village.
Resisting the exogenous nature of urbanisation
In numerous villages surrounding Hanoi, local resistance to 
recovery of lands for urbanisation purposes is triggered by 
several grievances: the protection of local livelihoods that 
rely either on pluriactivity or on agriculture, the defence of 
the community ‘threatened’ by the arrival of a non-native 
population, the feeling of injustice and the perception that 
projects are harming the common good, the uncertainty and 
privation of reliable information, the precluding decision-
making processes and, prosaically, the insuﬃcient amount 
of compensation.2 Some arguments can be stronger in some 
villages than others, but generally speaking, all resistance 
encompasses these elements one way or another.
Migrant workers in suburban HCMC: towards an emergent autonomous activism? 
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In HCMC’s metropolitan area, suburban areas are home to a significant concentra-
tion of population and industrial estates. Essentially funded by foreign companies, 
HCMC’s industrial parks are hubs for export activities and flows of internal migrant 
workers.1 This concentration leads to various social and economic issues, including 
the temporary and incomplete integration of migrant workers into the community. 
Mostly coming from rural areas, Vietnamese migrant workers suﬀer various social 
and economic diﬃculties essentially due to a restrictive and obsolete internal 
residency permit system known as the hộ khẩu system. In response to such a 
precarious situation, Vietnamese migrant workers establish multiple individual and 
collective adaptation strategies. Furthermore, the dynamics linking the suburban 
areas, industrial estates and worker dormitories, create a new dominated social 
class eager to claim social rights and seek recognition from the authorities.
Trân Khă´c Minh
A typical worker 
dormitory in a 
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HCMC (district 
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From economic insecurity and social stigmatisation  
to adaptation strategies
Migrant workers’ integration into the city is complicated  
for several reasons, both material and immaterial. Firstly,  
the majority of migrant workers live in poorly equipped  
dormitories, sharing small rooms of 15-18 square metres.2 
Migrant workers’ consumption patterns and lifestyles are  
also characterised by the rationalisation of essential expenses, 
leaving aside leisure expenses. Their working lives are mono-
tonous and exhausting, yet they are poorly paid, with  
monthly wages ranging from 100 to 200 euros per month.
Alongside the economic insecurity, migrant workers in  
HCMC also suﬀer from social stigmas, reflected clearly in a 
restrictive residential registration system and a widely held 
anti-migrant mentality in the Vietnamese urban society. The 
majority of migrant workers in HCMC only own short-term 
residency permits (KT3 or KT4), which have many administrative 
constraints: owners of these residency permits are unable to  
access the housing market, to send their children to public 
schools or to benefit from the local healthcare system. 
Furthermore, the administrative process to obtain permanent 
residency permits for migrant workers is particularly slow  
or even deliberately delayed by local authorities.3 The anti- 
migrant mentality pervasive in the Vietnamese society leads to  
inferiorisation of the migrants.4 Finally, the relationship between 
migrant workers and the local suburban population could be 
described as an identity conflict between a young and dynamic 
urban world, inspired by modernity, and a declining ancient rural 
world.5 Industrial zones in Vietnamese metropolises are a perfect 
theatre for these oppositions to flourish, and in doing so, they 
contribute to the production of ‘unequal cities’ in Vietnam.
Spatially segregated and socially stigmatised, migrant 
workers in HCMC suburban areas develop a large range  
of adaptation strategies to facilitate their integration into  
the city. Community support networks, tightly linked to  
worker dormitories, represent the most primitive form of  
these adaptation strategies. They are strictly based on regional  
aﬃliations of migrant workers. They are also characterised 
by their omnipresence and versatility: community networks 
are able to disseminate information and to provide daily and 
financial support to migrants. Despite their unquestionable 
importance, these networks have many structural weaknesses. 
As they rely mainly on workers’ dormitories and regional  
aﬃliations, they create a new communitarianism that aggra-
vates the segregation between local population and migrant 
workers, and also between diﬀerent migrant communities.
Emergence of a new, autonomous, decentralised  
and spontaneous worker activism
The collective dimension of migrant workers’ adaptation 
strategies relies less on community support networks than 
on the development of an autonomous, spontaneous and 
decentralised worker activism. The đổi mới reforms marked  
the beginning of an important liberal turn of the State on  
labour questions with a withdrawal from the negotiations  
between workers and employers. Consequently, tensions  
between workers and companies have progressively increased,  
leading to intense worker mobilisations from 2006 to 2008.  
Since then, a strong worker activism has emerged. 
Struggle and opposition methods are sophisticated.  
Based on local migrant communities, workers’ mobilisations 
are spontaneous and decentralised; waves of actions are 
organised from one industrial zone to another. The leaders  
of these movements are usually kept anonymous,6 as their  
organisational roles are essential for these mobilisations. 
Ways of resisting are particularly diverse, combining soft 
methods such as collective petitions, and hard methods such 
as collective resignations or abandonment of work to paralyse 
the production line. The degree of intensity of these strategies 
depends on the employer’s reaction; without meaningful 
results from soft methods, hard strategies will be initiated  
to force employers to engage in negotiations.
State withdrawal from labour issues and the crisis  
of the Vietnamese trade union
Before the đổi mới reforms, labour issues were entirely in the 
hands of the State. To protect workers’ interests, the Vietnamese 
government established its own executive organism – the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Aﬀairs (MOLISA). The 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) had also created a unique 
national trade union, the Vietnam General Confederation  
of Labour (VGCL), to take charge of labour issues. 
After the đổi mới reforms commenced, the role of the State 
in labour protection issues became more and more obsolete. 
Today, the VGCL and the MOLISA are particularly weak in 
protecting workers. The slow legal procedures when organising 
a strike and the ineﬃciency of VGCL’s local cells cannot provide 
a strong framework for workers’ mobilisations. Essentially 
remaining under the control of the CPV, the VGCL appears to  
be a simple propaganda tool.  
The diminishing role of the State in labour protection issues 
has led to the emergence of worker activism. The development 
of a new worker activism is essentially based on the emergence 
of a new political actor, ‘the informal workers’ leaders’, who co-
ordinate the movement at a local level. The relation between this 
new political actor and the State is particularly conflictual. For 
example, the VGCL and the MOLISA exclude all informal workers’ 
leaders from labour issues negotiations. According to the State, 
the informal workers’ leaders are considered to be reactionary 
and politically incompatible with the communist party. 
Confronted with the erosion of its legitimacy, the State  
has recently undertaken a set of policies aiming to improve  
workers’ living conditions and to reform the VGCL. In 2005, 
a new household registration procedure was created with a 
simplification of the criteria for obtaining permanent residency 
permits.7 In 2007, a new residence law was enacted that allowed 
230,000 migrants in HCMC to obtain their permanent residency 
permit.8 As a consequence, the household registration system  
is becoming less and less of an administrative constraint for  
migrants trying to settle in the cities. The State has also estab-
lished policies to improve migrant workers’ living conditions 
through new bank loan systems, to encourage the construction 
of aﬀordable low-income housing and micro-credit systems,  
with the help from NGOs and international institutions.
To better protect migrant workers, multiple stakeholders 
are involved: media, provincial authorities, informal workers’ 
leaders, the State, etc. Henceforth, provincial authorities man-
age worker issues by conducting negotiations between compa-
nies and workers. In 2007, a revision of the Labour Law defined 
a solid framework for workers’ mobilisations. Consequently, 
the VCGL has been attached to provincial authorities, while its 
local cells have been involved in companies’ management. In 
HCMC, diﬀerent initiatives have been conducted to integrate 
informal leaders into the protection of workers: the number 
of labour inspectors has increased from 7 to 100 since 2006, 
and self-managed worker groups have also been organised.9 
Nevertheless, under the supervision of the VCP, the VCGL is 
categorically opposed to this change, as it considers informal 
workers’ leaders to be reactionary agents. In 2014, the 
anti-China worker riots in Binh Duong province threatened the 
involvement of the State. The government decided to oppress 
worker activism, condemning anti-China riots as a reactionary 
movement. In conclusion, the relationship between the State 
and worker activism is extremely ambiguous and fragile.  
By tackling political issues, contemporary activism appears  
to be directly opposing the VCP hegemony.
Despite the State’s attempts to pacify the situation, the 
recent policies present several weaknesses. Firstly, the majority 
of migrant workers are still excluded from permanent resi-
dency because companies commonly refuse to sign long-term 
contracts, which is one of the most important criteria to obtain 
permanent residency permits.10 Secondly, microcredit and 
social housing are scarce and hardly accessible to migrant 
workers. Finally, migrant workers do not show a strong will to 
integrate. Migrant workers’ careers are unstable, temporary and 
unsustainable, which does not encourage hope for permanent 
settlement in HCMC. The intention to return to their native 
provinces is rooted in many migrant workers’ mentality. 
In conclusion, the integration of migrant workers to HCMC is 
essentially characterised by a fundamental economic and social 
insecurity, despite various individual and collective adaptation 
strategies. Migrants remain second-class city-dwellers who 
cannot aﬀord, and are not given the opportunity, to integrate – 
spatially,  economically or socially. On top of this exclusion,  
their citizen’s rights are denied as they cannot participate  
in the local agora, councils and branches of mass organisations 
included, while their representation in the work sphere is 
limited. In order to challenge this situation, workers have started 
to organise, progressively constituting a new ‘class’ of workers,  
but also of inhabitants. The State clearly needs to encourage  
migrant integration and to tackle the issues of worker pro-
tection. A radical reform of the VGCL would be essential to  
better embed the contemporary informal worker activism that 
is arising. A balanced power relationship between workers, 
companies and authorities is a prerequisite for the integration  
of migrants in the suburbs of HCMC, and society at large. 
Trân Khă´c Minh is a PhD student at Prodig research unit 
(UMR 8586) and Pantheon-Sorbonne University (France). 
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Vietnamese cities are key in the regional positioning of their country’s tourism  
sector. The authorities have encouraged this role, aiming for a stronger urban  
hierarchy. From the local to the international level, tourism participates in the  
material and symbolic production of Vietnamese cities. It is a significant factor  
in urban growth and architectural changes, but tourism also fosters global  
integration.
Emmanuelle Peyvel & Võ Sáng Xuân Lan
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IN 2014, THERE WAS A RECORD NUMBER of 38.5 million  
dom-estic tourists and 7.87 million international visitors in 
Vietnam, generating 7.3 billion euros.1 According to the World 
Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), that amount represented 
9.3% of the GDP and 7.7% of total employment in that same 
year (including jobs indirectly supported by the industry).2  
This mobility is fast growing: in 20 years, domestic tourism  
has multiplied by a factor of 11 and international tourism  
by 8. While the growth of international tourism in Vietnam  
is impressive, we should keep in mind that it only represents  
a third of the visitors to Thailand and a seventh of those in 
China. Nevertheless, this country is an ever-more popular 
destination in Pacific Asia, which remains one of the most 
dynamic touristic regions in the world: this region received  
less than one hundredth of the international tourism flow  
in 1950, it now receives almost a fifth. By 2030, the World 
Tourism Organization (WTO) forecasts an average annual 
growth rate of 3.3% worldwide, 4.9% in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, 
Asia is today a center of gravity in the global tourism system,  
in which Vietnam fully belongs. Tourist nationalities reflect 
both regional and international links with the past: the Chinese, 
Korean and Japanese respectively occupy the top three places, 
the USA comes in 4th, Russia 6th and France 11th.
The growth of tourism is a consequence of the urban  
transformations in the country since Đổi Mới. Indeed, tourism  
and cities entertain a privileged relationship: cities are both  
gateways for international tourism and transit points structuring 
the tourist map of the country, but they are also destinations in  
their own right. For all these reasons, tourism is an essential actor 
in Vietnamese urbanisation, both materially and symbolically. 
It is a factor of urban growth and architectural transformations, 
but also fosters global integration with its associated flows  
of people, capital, practices and imaginary. 
Tourism also contributes to urban lifestyles. It shows us  
the types of city-dwellers that the Vietnamese are becoming, 
the expression of their individuality, their aspirations and 
the meaning they assign to wealth. Tourism is a good way to 
understand how the Vietnamese society builds its relation-
ship with time, both past and future. The Vietnamese city 
is increasingly valued for its emblematic places of both 
modernity – embodied by buildings and shopping malls –  
and historical depth – with active heritage policies, and now 
8 properties inscribed on the UNESCO List of World Heritage 
that contribute to an international recognition of the country.
We will study these transformations from a geographical 
perspective to better understand how tourism is actively 
involved in contemporary spatial changes in Vietnamese cities. 
This work was conducted by delving into French colonial  
archives, planning documents and oﬃcial statistical sources, 
with participative observations made during long term field- 
work in Vietnam. At the national scale, we demonstrate that 
tourism is a factor of urban growth and ex nihilo constructions. 
At the regional scale, we highlight the role of cities in the struc-
turing of major tourist regions. At the local scale, we analyse 
the role of tourism in the globalisation of Vietnamese cities. 
Tourism as an urban and colonial creation 
The history of tourism in Vietnam reveals the complexities  
of globalisation. Recreational mobilities, such as hydrotherapy 
and pilgrimage, are not new: travelers’ tales echo Chinese 
aesthetics of landscape and body. However, the modern 
understanding of tourism appeared with French colonisation 
and the construction of the first infrastructures dedicated to 
tourism:3   7 seaside resorts (Hòn Gay, Đồ Sơn, Sầm Sơn, Cửa Lò, 
Cửa Tùng, Nha Trang and Cap St Jacques, renamed Vũng Tàu), 
and 5 hill stations (Đà Lạt, Bà Nà, Tam Đảo, Mau Son and Sa 
Pa). Those places were chosen for aesthetic and landscape 
considerations. However, the proximity to big cities, where 
settlers were concentrated, is essential in understanding the 
location of those stations and resorts. Indeed, those places 
were created for the rest and recreation of city dwellers.4 In the 
North, Hanoi commanded three hill stations (Sa Pa, Tam Đảo 
and the small station of Mẫu Sơn) and four seaside resorts, that 
were directly dependent on medium-sized towns: Cửa Lò in 
connection with Vinh, Đồ Sơn and Hòn Gay with Hải Phòng and 
Sầm Sơn with Thanh Hóa. In the South, Sài Gòn’s dwellers could 
enjoy the seaside resort of Cap Saint Jacques and the hill sta-
tions of Đà Lạt. They also gradually invested in seaside resorts 
such as Phan Thiết and Nha Trang. In the Centre, the settlers 
of Tourane (today Đà Nẵng), and to a lesser extent of Huế and 
Faïfo (Hội An today), could visit the hill station of Bà Nà and  
the seaside resort of Cửa Tùng.
In the colonial context, these stations were outstanding, 
not only for the physical landscape, but also in the way they 
were conceived. Recreational landscape transgressed both 
the spiritual function traditionally given to the mountains 
by the Kinh people, and the livelihood function assigned to 
the sea by the fishing culture. Both the mountain and the sea 
were feared. That explains the extent to which hotels, sport 
fields, hiking trails, panoramas and belvederes that were built 
in the mountains, or seafronts and beaches developed along 
the shoreline, constituted profound spatial innovations.  
At that time, the practices and representations associated 
with these infrastructures were totally new to the Kinh 
people. Tourism was therefore not only a populating activity, 
it also participated in the circulation of urban practices into 
rural places such as Đà Lạt, on the mountainous plateau of 
Lang Bian, where phones, running water, electricity and even 
cinemas suddenly made their appearance with the first 
tourists.5
Tourism-driven urbanism has been sustained despite  
decolonisation, war and the Bao Cấp period; none of the  
recreational destinations have disappeared. Today, all of  
them still live oﬀ tourism, and three have even experienced  
demographic growth and economic diversification, giving 
them a complete city status. Vũng Tàu and Nha Trang now 
exceed 400,000 inhabitants; their economy is being diversified 
with oil and fishing, and even academics in Nha Trang.  
Đà Lạt has over 214,000 inhabitants living mainly from tourism, 
horticulture and academics today. Tourist conurbations  
have been built, particularly between Phan Thiết and Mũi Né, 
and between Đà Nẵng and Hội An. Mainly fuelled by big resorts, 
this phenomenon has led to the privatisation of the coastline,  
which can lead to conflicts with the local people who see  
their access to the sea increasingly restricted. 
Urban hierarchy and the regional structuration of tourism
Today, cities are key in the structuring of tourism in the 
country. This function was encouraged by the Vietnamese 
authorities in their first development plan, for the period 
1995-2000. This plan initially identified four tourism regions: 
North, Central, South Central and South of the country, each 
structured by a regional capital and a well identified urban 
network. The Northern region, stretching from Hà Giang  
to Hà Tĩnh, was arranged around Hanoi and secondarily  
by Hạ Long Bay, and by the seaside resorts Sầm Sơn and  
Đồ Sơn. Hanoi also gives shape to tourism by means of tours  
to ‘ethnic minorities’ in the Northern mountains, mainly 
through the town of Lào Cai. The Central region, stretching 
from Quảng Bình to Quảng Ngãi, was arranged around Huế  
and Đà Nẵng, and diﬀerentiates itself through visits to  
historical sites related to the former imperial capital Huế,  
to war heritage (with the DMZ) and to the Cham civilisation 
(with Mỹ Sơn). Hội An has continued to gain traction in this 
region, particularly since its UNESCO classification in 1999.  
More recently, the third and fourth regions were merged. 
Initially formed by the South of the Centre and the South,  
this entity now extends from Kon Tum to Minh Hải, and has  
been arranged primarily around HCMC, but secondarily  
also Nha Trang and Đà Lạt.
The Review | 39
The Newsletter | No.73 | Spring 2016
Even today, land use and development plans still confirm  
the central role of Hanoi in the North, the urban trio of Huế,  
Đà Nẵng and Hội An in the Centre, and HCMC in the South. 
Acting as the capitals of their regions, they can be a driving 
force for their territory. The inner suburbs of Hanoi benefit 
from increasing tourism, especially in some craft villages and 
remarkable pagodas.6 This phenomenon is also striking in the 
Mekong Delta, where ecotourism is now well developed in 
Bến Tre, Cần Thơ, Sa Đéc, Vĩnh Long and Mỹ Tho. Tourism is in 
constant progression in the region of Long Xuyên and Châu  
Đốc with the normalisation of the Cambodian border.  
The State oﬃcially recognises a number of national tourism 
regions (Khu du lịch quốc gia; KDLQG); these are regions whose 
infrastructures have welcomed at least 1 million tourists per 
year, in an area larger than 1000 hectares. Today, there are  
21 KDLQG (an estimated 39 by 2030), mostly located near  
big and medium-sized cities, because they have a recreational 
function for city-dwellers. The State recognition of these  
areas confirms the urban predominance.
Tourism contributes to the strengthening of the Vietnam-
ese urban hierarchy: its flows, infrastructures and revenues are 
more concentrated in the East than in the West of the country, 
that is to say the most urbanised part of the country. While the 
provinces of Hanoi, Quảng Ninh and Hải Phòng alone account 
for over 15% of the country’s hotel rooms, those of Bà Rịa, Vũng 
Tàu and HCMC have over 18%. However, the Centre region is 
more fragmented, resulting from the dual influences of both 
Hanoi and HCMC. Hanoi and HCMC together account for over 
80% of the five-star hotels in the country. It is also in these two 
metropolitan centers that the leading structures of tourism 
are concentrated: between 2000 and 2009, Hanoi and HCMC 
together accounted for 67% of the country’s total tourism 
turnover (see the map). 
Tourism, a means of globalisation for Vietnamese cities
For Vietnamese cities, tourism is also a powerful means of 
integration into the global economy, since they are the main 
target of foreign direct investment. Global companies are 
established in the country, such as Accor, the world leader  
in hotel management, which has been authorised in the 
country since 1991. Less than 25 years later, it manages  
16 hotels, representing more than 4000 rooms. However,  
this global capitalism follows a specific Vietnamese format, 
due to socialism.7 The State remains a strategic player in the 
tourism sphere. Rather than pulling out of business abruptly  
for the sole benefit of the private sector, it has restructured  
its practices. It still oversees the development of tourism 
through laws, development plans and investments,  
especially in transport and training. The current investment 
plan, running until 2030 and amounting to 94.2 billion dollars, 
aims to deliver infrastructure upgrades, train the personnel 
according to international standards, and to align tourism  
with the discourse of sustainable development. Public 
actors are therefore essential, from the central to the local. 
Saigontourist, a company built in 1975 and revamped in 1999 
under the control of the popular committee of the city,  
is a good example of the new modes of action of the State. 
With a total capital of over 152 million dollars, it acts as the 
owner, manager or investor in catering, accommodation, 
transport, sport and culture. In 2015, Saigontourist owned  
54 hotels (including some luxury hotels of HCMC), 8 travel 
service companies, 13 resorts and 28 restaurants, making  
it the biggest tourism company in Vietnam.
The diﬀerent transport modes used by tourists also  
confirms the urban predominance: cities are both hubs for 
national tourism and destination themselves. According to 
the results of the tourist expenditure survey (2013), if cars and 
minibuses are the most popular mode of transport, fostering  
a real spread of tourism across the country, airplanes are specific 
to large cities, with the exception of areas that have benefited 
from a strong-willed transport policy, such as Điện Biên Phủ,  
Đà Lạt et Ban Mê Thuột. In this perspective, it is interesting to 
note that tourism could legitimise the opening up of certain 
areas, such as the island of Phú Quốc and the Côn Đảo archipelago 
in the South of the country. As international and national hubs, 
big Vietnamese cities present the most varied modes of 
transport for tourists. While the train is slowly declining due  
to its slow speed and comparative cost, it is still present 
wherever airport connections are not yet eﬀective (as in the  
axis Hanoi/Lào Cai). It also constitutes a popular mode of 
transport to domestic seaside resorts, as in the province of  
Nghệ An. Vietnamese cities act as tourist hubs, with one notable 
exception: they are not cruise cities, despite Vietnam being a 
coastal country. As a means of transport, the boat is still ignored, 
and the cruising market is almost inexistent, despite significant 
potential. The authorities are keen to develop the sector, 
especially in HCMC; by 2030, it aims to become a Southeast  
Asia tourist center by hosting cruise ships.
Producing the Vietnamese cities through and by tourism
At the local scale, tourism aﬀects the architectural changes of 
Vietnamese cities. The seaside resorts built for this sole activity 
are organised according to the waterfront. Since the sea has  
become a landscape, resorts stretch along the coastline.  
Now, this landscape determines the land value: the further 
away from the seaside, the less the land costs, and the less the 
city is dense. Socialism has profoundly changed urbanisation 
in these seaside resorts and the access to land. The Northern 
seaside resort of Cửa Lò, that depends mostly on domestic 
tourism, is a good example of this land functioning: the largest 
and most central locations are owned by the State, which built 
accommodations parallel to the sea. As a consequence, the 
most recent private accommodations are forced either to fit 
into the existing urban discontinuities, within the tubular forms 
perpendicular to the sea, or they are relegated to the edges of 
the resorts, where the land necessary for the most ambitious 
projects, such as golf courses, is located. In the bigger seaside 
resorts, like Vũng Tàu, Nha Trang and Hạ Long City, where 
international tourism increases the land pressure, the State  
can sell its well-located properties at high prices.
In the cities that tourism has not created, but where it 
was introduced, architectural and functional transformations 
also take place. Neighborhoods can revolve around tourism, 
especially in HCMC, with the backpacker area of Phạm Ngũ Lão, 
in Hanoi (36 Streets area) or in Nha Trang (between Nguyễn Thị 
Minh Khai and Tuệ Tĩnh streets, along the seafront promenade 
Trần Phú). The architecture and the functioning of these 
neighborhoods result from a hybridisation typical of  
globalisation, between local characteristics and globalised 
consumption patterns of leisure. Indeed, it is quite common in 
Vietnam for a district to specialise in an economic activity. In 
such areas, tourism is inserted into the existing grid of roads, 
made up of major arteries connected to a dense network of 
alleyways that are well-suited to tubular houses, and adapted 
to the land pressure, which tourism also favors. 
The urban landscape is also specific because of billboards, 
neon signs, advertisement – often in foreign languages,  
mainly English, but also Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian  
and French. They create a cosmopolitan atmosphere, especially 
recognisable at night. Dedicated to pleasure, these neighbor-
hoods have an exceptional concentration of bars, restaurants, 
travel agencies, nightclubs, spas and nail salons. Recognised 
as particularly cosmopolitan and permissive, they can be 
frequented by young and wealthy Vietnamese mingling with 
travelers. They participate in the development of an urban rest 
and recreation culture (having a drink with friends, dancing, 
partying, etc.) that modifies the bodily and behavioral norms, 
visible in the outfits, alcohol and drugs consumption, and the 
presence of prostitutes, although formally condemned as social 
vices by the socialist regime. The entwinement of tourist and 
leisure practices also characterises the gamification of city 
centers, where festivals and exhibitions are more and more 
numerous. Closely associated with the event policy of major 
cities, tourism has become a matter of economic development 
and cultural influence for the authorities, as the example of 
the Huế festival shows us. As a result, many facilities have been 
redeveloped, especially on the waterfront (like in Vũng Tàu or in 
in HCMC, with the Nhiêu Lộc canal) and major urban parks, like 
the Lenin Park in Hanoi or the Bình Quới Park in in HCMC.
Staging Vietnamese cities: tourism and the construction  
of national identity, modernity and authenticity
Finally, tourism contributes to the symbolic staging of the city. 
This function is primarily political, imposed by the socialist 
regime: regional and national capitals are privileged places  
for national building. It is there that one finds most of the  
museums, in particular those that specialise in history, war  
and national heroes. The most frequented museums are the  
Hồ Chí Minh Mausoleum and the museum of ethnology in 
Hanoi, and the War Remnants Museum and the Reunification 
palace in HCMC, two hot spots for both domestic and 
international tourism. 
Vietnamese cities also have a symbolic role in the country’s 
relation to time: today they embody both modernity and 
heritage. They provide a spectacle of modernity that by itself 
justifies a visit, as evidenced by the growing phenomenon of 
sightseeing from tower-tops (like the Bitexco Tower in HCMC, 
or the Lotte Center Skyscraper in Hanoi), but also by the in-
creasing popularity of bars, restaurants and hotels with rooftop 
terraces. Shopping malls, as a quintessential urban activity, 
also constitute a destination for tourists. HCMC and Hanoi in 
particular guarantee access to certain products, especially 
imported or luxurious ones that can’t be found elsewhere. 
Since 1997 and the opening of the Saigon Center (District 1), 
HCMC has added no less than a dozen major malls, all of them 
located in the city center (like Vincom Center in the Dong Khoi 
emblematic street, or Diamond Plaza, strategically located 
behind the cathedral) or in new centralities such as Saigon 
South. Visiting new buildings and shopping is an experience 
of urban modernity both for tourists and city dwellers who 
participate in the globalised circulation of leisure models and 
consumption patterns.8 
At the same time, some cities in the country build on 
consensual Vietnamese tradition and identity. Vietnamese 
heritages are the subject of specific protection and care. 
Among the 8 properties inscribed on the UNESCO List of World 
Heritage in Vietnam, 4 are in cities: the Huế Monuments since 
1993, Hội An ancient town since 1999, the imperial citadel  
of Hanoi since 2010 and the citadel of Hồ dynasty since 2011. 
Interestingly, HCMC is still struggling to play a significant role  
in the development of heritage in of the country.
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After decades of war and destruction, followed by the reunification of 
the country in 1976, the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam gave right 
of way to social and economic reconstruction and development. Archi-
tectural and urban heritage preservation did not appear as a priority 
de facto. However, in 1984 a first decree related to the preservation 
of historical and cultural relics was issued. This first step was followed 
during the 1990s by a broad inventory, led by the Ministry of Culture, 
to identify Vietnam’s heritage throughout the country. Eventually, the 
first law regarding cultural heritage was adopted in 2001 to protect 
monuments, notably in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). Through 
these key stages, the increasing interest for architectural and urban 
heritage matched the new urban dynamics that took place, namely 
the metropolisation process and the development of tourism. On the 
one hand, metropolisation implies the increase of private investments 
that contribute to reshaping the urban landscape. On the other hand, 
the development of the tourism industry pushed the authorities to 
think of ways to value places of interest, in order to attract visitors. 
These trends constitute a first step towards urban heritage thinking.
Clément Musil
Located at 190 
Nguyê˜n Thi. Minh Khai 
Street, this villa in a 
dilapidated state is 
sandwiched between 
two towers (photo 
by Clément Musil).
TODAY, THE OUTCOMES of the heritage preservation policies 
are, however, contrasted between Hanoi and HCMC. Though 
both cities have urban heritage assets to value, especially  
traditional, religious and colonial heritage, the capital city  
Hanoi has received much more attention from the Government. 
The trailing situation in HCMC allows for the exploration of 
what urban heritage in Vietnam is today, and how to consider 
and preserve it. To address these issues, this paper gives three 
diﬀerent stakeholders concerned by urban heritage policies  
in HCMC the opportunity to deliver their viewpoint.
The viewpoint of an international cooperation stakeholder
Fanny Quertamp (Co-director of PADDI-HCM City Urban 
Development Management Support Centre),1 interviewed  
by Clément Musil.
In 2010, UNESCO inscribed Hanoi’s Imperial Citadel on  
its World Heritage list. Prior to that, numerous international 
organisations, namely Japanese and French bilateral  
cooperations, and especially the French decentralised  
cooperation of the city of Toulouse and the Île-de-France Region  
(Paris metropolitan area), had conducted joint projects with  
the Hanoian authorities to identify and preserve remarkable 
architecture and specific neighbourhoods. In HCMC, however, 
no international institutional organisations besides your own  
(PADDI) are engaged in the urban heritage field. How do 
you explain the singular position of your institute?
Originally, the cooperation between the Lyon metropolitan 
area, Rhône-Alpes Region (France) and HCMC, of which  
PADDI is today an operational instrument, started in the early 
1990s and was initiated by urban heritage issues. At that time, 
the Lyon metropolitan area was providing technical support 
to the city to launch its first heritage inventory. Further to 
a request from HCMC’s technical departments, and since 
2010, PADDI provides specific expertise concerning inventory 
methods as well as the drawing up of urban heritage  
preservation policies and tools.
There are great diﬀerences between Hanoi, Huê´, and  
HÔ. i An on one hand, and HCMC on the other, regarding  
their historical and architectural heritage. There are also 
diﬀerences concerning the measures adopted by the central 
and the local governments to preserve urban heritage.  
Hanoi is the capital of the country with a broad history; the 
city celebrated its millennium in 2010. Huê´  was the imperial 
capital of the Nguyê#n dynasty from the early 19th century  
and HÔ. i An is a harbour that foreign sailors have visited since 
the 17th century. The urban fabric of these cities has been 
shaped by their administrative and political functions and  
also by external influences that they absorbed.
HCMC, which was renamed after the reunification and 
was initially composed of two urban cores, namely Saigon 
and Cholon, started to see urban settlement in the late 18th 
century. This is why HCMC is today considered to be a young 
city that welcomed several waves of migration, notably during 
the Indochina and Vietnam wars (refugees) and nowadays 
(workers), and is seen as a melting pot with a plural identity. 
Unlike Hanoi, HCMC cannot claim to have a consistent urban 
heritage area as the phố cổ (old quarter). The old quarter of 
Hanoi receives particular attention from the Government for 
being part of the urban heritage that is considered purely 
Vietnamese without any foreign influence and thus contributes 
to shaping a national identity. By contrast, HCMC is seen more 
as a city dedicated to the country’s economic development.  
Its metropolitan area is today the main economic engine of the 
country as well as the gateway for Foreign Direct Investments. 
Moreover, its architectural and urban heritage is fragmented 
and spread out across the urban territory, and the city does not 
have a vast heritage area or any major iconic cultural buildings.
During the 1990s, HCMC compiled its inventory list as 
other cities did. Monuments, historical and architectural sites 
were identified, including buildings inherited from the colonial 
period. In other cities, however, such inventories led to the 
adoption of concrete measures (e.g., in 1996, Hanoi approved a 
preservation plan for the Hoàn Kiê´m Lake area and in 1998 the 
Old Quarter Management Oﬃce was created), while in HCMC 
listed buildings were approved only occasionally (e.g., pagodas 
and monumental public buildings). Until today, the main target 
of the authorities is to develop HCMC as an economic hub. 
However, internally, within the municipal departments, urban 
heritage becomes an insistent question of debate: how to com-
bine urban and architectural preservation while the economy is 
booming? Today, those departments do not have any clear and 
detailed regulation at their disposal to preserve urban heritage, 
whereas it is disappearing increasingly. This preoccupation was 
recently put to the forefront of public debate because of the 
demolition of iconic buildings like the Eden Quarter and several 
villas inherited from the colonial period, with currently more 
villas severely threatened by demolition. 
Often it is stressed that there is a gap between western  
and eastern consideration regarding urban heritage.  
In this field in particular, do your local partners share  
the same values as you?
Actually, our concern is mostly to support our partners in  
the implementation of their tasks. Today, on their part, there 
is a real shift from a cultural and monumental approach  
to heritage, to a more urban approach. This is particularly  
a consequence of the involvement of diﬀerent institutional 
partners. This shift is promising with regard to the preserva-
tion of buildings as well as authentic neighbourhoods. Among 
our partners, the Department of Culture, for instance, has 
a ‘monumental’ approach to urban heritage. It isolates the 
building’s historic and aesthetic value without considering  
its surroundings and the dialogue that a building has with  
its urban environment. In 2009, however, the city approved  
a decision to produce a revised inventory of existing villas  
built before 1975, putting the Department of Urban Planning  
and Architecture in charge. This Department pushes to refine  
the concept of heritage, going beyond the building and its  
monumentality, and focusing on the relationship with the 
urban environment. Today, it is precisely in this aspect that  
PADDI assists the Department, notably to support the 
development of a methodology of the inventory work.
Currently, it is a major challenge to overcome the ‘mon-
umental’ heritage approach. The value of a monument is not 
only linked to its history and its authenticity, but also to its 
contribution to the urban identity. In addition, there is a real 
preoccupation concerning a wide acceptation about heritage 
such as urban landscapes, or urban infrastructure such as 
canals and river banks. Adopting a broader sense of urban 
heritage is also in line with the definitions set by UNESCO  
in 2011 regarding historic urban landscape.
Although there is real eﬀort and willingness to give  
meaning to the urban heritage as a whole, local authorities 
lack the tools to assess, define, classify and regulate urban 
heritage. PADDI is today supporting the authorities in 
developing new inventory tools, which will enable them to 
adopt new and more comprehensive regulations to preserve 
architectural and urban heritage in HCMC.
The viewpoint of a local expert
Nguyê#n Tro· ng Hòa (High-ranking oﬃcial from Ho Chi Minh 
City, former director of the Department of Architecture  
and Urban Planning and former director of the HIDS-Ho Chi 
Minh City Institute for Development Studies), interviewed  
by Clément Musil and translated by Đô# Phương Thúy.
In the context of Ho Chi Minh City’s rapid urbanisation, what 
does the notion of urban heritage mean for the municipality?
Whereas Ho Chi Minh City and other cities in Vietnam are 
developing rapidly, the notion of urban heritage is still under 
discussion and remains controversial. Currently, among the 
local and central authorities there is no consensus regarding this 
notion and there is clearly a lack of definition. For instance, some 
issues remain concerning the pool of villas built in HCMC before 
1975, such as how to even determine the year of construction, 
because some villas have been modified and divided many times 
by the occupants, mostly after the reunification of the country.
As HCMC is driven by fast economic growth, the will persists 
to make room for modernity, which means replacing old build-
ings with modern ones. As preserving historic and architectural 
heritage is today a wish of the municipality, it is essential to 
extend the notion of heritage from a single building to its geo-
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Nam Mansion located 
at 110-112 Võ Văn 
Tâ`n Street is one of 
the largest colonial 
residences in the city 
(Courtesy of PADDI).
graphical location. Urban heritage should not be reduced to an 
individual construction, but must include its context and other 
features, such as gardens, fences, trees, as well as landscapes, 
including the surrounding canals and river banks, and even the 
whole neighbourhood with its ‘immaterial’ heritage. But above 
all, it is necessary to emphasise that the urban heritage issue  
is first of all a matter of preservation that excludes demolition.
Today, even though Vietnam has a heritage code, its 
application is complicated. It is especially diﬃcult to enforce the 
law for private buildings. Classifying a public building, despite it 
being a time-consuming process, remains feasible because the 
city’s technical departments can access the plot and the archives 
(when they exist), and implement surveys. When the land 
belongs to a private owner or an organisation such as the Army, 
conducting an assessment becomes a real challenge. And in the 
case of private residential edifices, it is diﬃcult to convince the 
owners and to involve them in the preservation process. From a 
private owner or developer perspective, because land values in 
the inner city are so high, it brings more benefits to demolish a 
villa and build a high-rise, rather than to preserve it.
Until now, what has been done by the municipality regard-
ing preservation policies? And why does urban heritage 
today appear as a critical issue for the city authorities?
Until the early 1990s urban heritage was untouched. For 
instance, only a few villas were demolished, and most of them 
were only partially modified. Since 1990, with the economic 
take-oﬀ, the municipality needed land to attract foreign 
investors and to produce new buildings such as oﬃce towers 
or luxurious hotels to generate profit. That is when the first 
villas located on attractive plots started to disappear. As this 
economic pressure increased, the first awareness from the 
authorities occurred. In 1998, with the celebration of the 300th 
anniversary of the city, several architectural inventories were 
conducted. However, the detailed inventory concerning urban 
and architectural heritage has never been formally approved 
and turned into regulation; also part of this work has been lost.
From the early 2000s, the economic pressure was so 
strong that the urban and architectural heritage started to be 
seriously aﬀected. Informally, the issue of heritage preservation 
was pushed into the background, and priority was given to 
the economic development. Not only was heritage damaged, 
but the work of researchers was ‘badmouthed’. The physical 
impacts of this property development became evident in the 
city. The number of destroyed villas increased sharply and this 
became too ‘visible’. That triggered the kick-start of a second 
period of urban heritage conservation eﬀorts.
Since 2009 a new inventory has been in progress.  
Its purpose is not directly to classify but to identify in  
detail the urban heritage content. However, the city lacks 
methodology. This is why PADDI is today supporting the 
municipality in this task. The purpose of this inventory is 
not only preser-vation, but also to provide a tool to the city 
departments to regulate and manage urban heritage assets 
on the city scale. Unfortunately, progress is slow. Local 
experts and foreign colleagues undergo miscommunications. 
Not everything old will be preserved; it is likely that  
only exceptional buildings will be preserved as they are.  
Other villas, less remarkable, will be conserved due to their 
landscape assets, but their functions will change, as will their 
interiors. While the city departments try to design better 
regulations, villas continue to be demolished and the assets  
of the ancient Perle de L’Extrême Orient slowly disappear.  
Today if a building is not classified, nothing prevents its  
owner from demolishing it.
The viewpoint of a foreign historian
“From the Heart. How the memories inhabited by  
Saigon’s cityscape are being erased”, by Philippe Peycam 
(Director of the International Institute for Asian Studies).
“If you fire at the Past with the violence of the guns,  
it will fire back at you with canons.” It was with these 
words, borrowed by “an author from Daghestan”, that the 
famous southern historian Sơn Nam (1926-2008) concluded 
his contribution to a book celebrating Ho Chi Minh City’s 
multifaceted heritages.2 Sơn Nam, like other contemporary 
intellectuals from the South, knew the importance of heritage 
as material incarnations of popular collective memories, 
whether these memories invoked painful or happy moments. 
‘Collective memories as connections to a local place’ is perhaps 
the most democratic definition of the always ambivalent notion 
of heritage. Southern Vietnamese intellectuals like Sơn Nam 
strove to keep localised genealogies alive, drawing influence 
from Địa chí, the traditional Vietnamese literary genre of local 
monographs, giving life to people and stories of the past,  
of a hamlet, a ‘country’, a region, and by extension, a city,  
however miscellaneous and interwoven that local past might  
be. It is the southern Saigon spirit and its mix of contradictory  
emotions and imaginations – including political ones – that 
these authors and their readers sought to preserve and 
transmit to the millions of Saigonese, old and newcomers.
This visceral attachment to the land (and water ways),  
and its multiple layers of histories, echoes the presence of  
the early Khmers (Saigon was once called Prey Nokor), 
the early Vietnamese (người kinh) and Chinese (người hoa) 
settlers, the marks and scars left by later groups including 
the French, the Americans, the new Chinese and Vietnamese 
immigrants, but also followers of the Buddhist, Caodai, 
Catholic, Evangelist, Hoa-Hao and Muslim faiths, the Chams, 
the Indians, the Hindus, the post-1975 Vietnamese returnees, 
the new northern Vietnamese migrants, etc. 
Somehow, this need to nurture a distinctive Southern – 
Saigonese – way to be Vietnamese has been encapsulated in 
the words and acts of two revered former southern commu-
nist revolutionary figures from the first and second liberation 
wars: Trâ`n Văn Giàu (1911-2010), an early anticolonial activist 
and historian, and Trâ`n Ba. ch Đă`ng (1926-2007), the leader  
of the Saigon resistance against the Republic of Vietnam  
and its American backers. For as long as these two figures  
of modern Vietnam were alive they continued to hold high 
the flame of a distinct southern Vietnamese cultural integrity 
and a desire to locate Saigon in its historical continuity. When 
I was a doctoral student in Saigon in the 1990s, I learned how 
these two major local figures, however complicated their past 
political actions had been, stood as protectors of free-minded 
southern intellectuals like Sơn Nam, and how they continu-
ously supported micro initiatives aimed at uncovering and 
rehabilitating bits and pieces of the Saigon historical human 
puzzle. They stood firm, though they often found themselves 
powerless to oppose mindless urban projects put forward  
by the bureaucrats who controlled the city.
Already in the 1990s, blatantly destructive projects  
were put forward. For instance, the neoclassical French-built 
Peugeot building behind the Cathedral, from where Vietnam’s 
Independence was proclaimed on 2 September 1945 (by Giàu),  
was demolished by a coalition of interests involving the South 
Korean Chaebol Posco; and a Singapore-Malaysian investor 
hoping to build a modern high-rise building in the historical 
heart of the city (today the Sheraton Hotel) undermined 
the foundations of the adjacent 1930s Indian-built central 
Mosque. The ends of Giàu and Đă`ng’s public lives were 
increasingly devoted to expressing public outcry against 
nonsensical projects that one after the other wiped out  
parts of old Saigon. Regrettably, they were already too frail  
to pick a fight when the banks of the Chợ Lớn (Chinatown)  
Canal were bereft of their original – sometimes three-stories  
high – Chinese shop houses, the highest in Southeast Asia.
More was to come and the two men were no longer 
present when a new wave of unprecedented attacks on the 
historical fabric of the city was recently unleashed, such as 
the shady Vincom real estate company project that pulled 
down the Eden cinema complex and its surrounding block on 
Đồng Khởi Street, a block that housed more than 200 families, 
rich and poor, including the legendary Givral café. Surely, 
there should have been ways to keep elements of this central 
memory-rich landscape of the city. The speculative interests 
of Vincom, allied with the murky practices of the city’s leaders, 
sought another path. A few months later, the 213 Đồng Khởi 
Street building, the first concrete-built Art Deco high-rise in 
the Indochinese peninsula, still in good condition, was also 
wiped out along with a public park where so many of the 
city’s couples once spent their afternoons on a public bench 
in the shade of almost fifty-metre high trees. These landmarks 
of Saigon’s public popular culture have been demolished and 
replaced by half-empty shopping malls where exclusive luxury 
stores have replaced what were essentially public spaces – 
spaces where everyone was entitled to live and share the city. 
This list can easily be extended as no local memory-charged 
urban spaces have been spared. 
Today, the old naval construction complex of Ba Son, the 
most important site of anticolonial industrial struggle in the 
collective memory of the country, owned by the Vietnamese 
army, will soon be replaced by yet again another exclusive, 
mega-project with a huge footprint that will have no connec-
tion with the rest of Saigon’s urban landscape. In the words of 
urban sociologist Saskia Sassen, these mega-projects not only 
“raise the density of the city, they actually de-urbanise it.” 
What we now see is a systematic process of corporatisation 
of the metropolis’s urban landscape, which will “inevitably 
kill much urban tissue: little streets and squares, density of 
street-level shops and modest oﬃces, and so on.”3
Despite punctual eﬀorts carried out by members of the 
municipality’s technical departments to classify elements  
of urban heritage, the questions that remain for everyone  
who love(d?) this city are: why such a blindness on the part  
of the leaders? Can this be explained by a disconcerting lack of 
historical and cultural education? Or is it just basic, mediocre 
greed and collusion with big national and international corpo-
rate interests at the expense of all other concerns? Or else, is 
there some naïve idea of ‘progress’ in their mind to think that 
Đồng Khởi Street should become the Orchard Road of Saigon 
– with, like so many leaders of Asia, a blind admiration for the 
top-down corporatised Singaporean state model?
In the Vietnamese context, one thing is certain: this state 
of mind does not just betray a surrender of responsibility to 
the forces of global corporate interests vis-à-vis the people 
the Party represents, it also serves a political purpose.  
It connects with a past when Saigon dared to be more than  
a simple economic emporium for the country, when the city 
held the potential to represent an alternative way ‘to be and 
feel Vietnamese’. It leads indeed to the eﬀective annihilation 
of the spirit of a rebellious city and its people; a city where 
people no longer are allowed to have roots and attachments. 
A city divided between those who have and those who don’t, 
of transient dwellers, of salary-men/women and consumers, 
of refugees in their own city; a corporate de-urbanisation in 
the service of a cultural erasure of Vietnam’s South. Is this 
what awaits Vietnam as a whole, forty years after winning  
her unification at the price of millions of lives?
Clément Musil is a PhD Regional and City Planning,  
Associate researcher to IPRAUS (France) and PADDI 
(Vietnam) (musil.clement@gmail.com). 
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Beyond the visible development of its built environment, it is enlightening to  
read the current socio-spatial evolutions of a place through the lens of domestic 
and cultural urban practices. For example, the way in which diﬀerent categories  
of urban dwellers organise their ancestor worship is a revealing object of  
study, standing at the crossroads between geographical and anthropological  
approaches. This perspective oﬀers an intimate understanding of the ways in 
which urban dwellers – in their growing diversity – negotiate urban mutations  
on a daily and private basis. Focusing on ancestor worship is also an enlightening 
way to appreciate the settlement of new populations in the area, both in its  
reality and symbolically, as both the living and the dead migrate in the process.
Ngô Thi Thu Trang
Dealing with ancestor worship in a peri-urban context
Ancestor worship tends to take less time and occupy less 
space in urban areas today, whatever the category of urban 
population is concerned. Even indigenous dwellers tend to 
worship their ancestors in a less conventional manner than 
before. The most obvious changes with regard to the death 
anniversaries include the following: the altar has become 
smaller and simpler, and its votive objects less precious, 
although its location is still carefully chosen according to 
feng shui (Phong Thủy) precepts; while historically celebrated 
by sons in the context of a patrilineal cultural context, these 
ceremonies are now equally performed by daughters and 
daughters-in-law; urban dwellers in Bình Tân district no 
longer feel it to be appropriate to invite neighbours to the 
ceremonies; and a lack of space in the urban context means 
that ceremonies are becoming increasingly modest, and  
more often than not are held indoors. 
Mr. Long, an elderly original inhabitant of Bình Tân district, 
explained that he sticks to some traditional rules, but tries  
to adapt others: “Every year we have to organise the ngày giỗ, 
but the way we are doing it is partially disconnected from our 
previous countryside practices. Only few guests are invited. 
We maintain the worship just to make sure that our kids do 
not forget our custom within the family”. The ngày giỗ is still 
considered an occasion for a family gathering, where adults 
can teach children how to worship the ancestors, but it is less 
and less a broader social and neighbourhood event. Only close 
neighbours are invited, those who have been family friends 
for a long while. Mr. Long revealed that he would be reluctant 
to invite his new neighbours, those who recently moved to 
the area. The sense of collectiveness in an increasingly socially 
diverse area is challenged and thus gradually recomposed. 
The family cell has become the more appropriate unit 
with whom to perform worshipping rituals, reflecting the 
diminishing eﬀect of the neighbourly 
community as a social and cultural 
structuring factor.
Not only the old, but also the new 
inhabitants and owners of Bình Tân’s tube 
houses display a high degree of simp-
lification in their worshipping practices,  
and most of the families never invite  
their neighbours. They wouldn’t want to 
‘bother’ them and think it inappropriate 
in an urban context. Mrs Dau, a new 
dweller, of an advanced age: “I usually 
worship the anniversary of my husband’s 
death and my parents-in-laws’ anniver-
sary. However, next year, I will organise 
these celebrations together on one single 
day and I am not sure I will invite a lot of 
people. My children are too busy to help, 
and so are my neighbours. Here it is not 
like in the countryside; if we do a celebra-
tion party, it will disturb the neighbours.” 
The organisation of a single worship day 
for all the family ancestors has become  
a matter of convenience and appropriate 
social behaviour in an urban context. 
A lack of space in the urban context 
may also play a role in the simplification 
of the worshipping practices. Without 
gardens or courtyards, and legal permits  
required for making use of public 
spaces, death anniversary ceremonies 
are increasingly often kept indoors,  
and thus celebrated with a reduced 
number of guests.
Migrant workers, who have recently settled in Bình  
Tân, generally continue to participate in ceremonies held  
in their rural hometowns, where worshipping remains  
quite a traditional practice. For celebrations, notably  
death anniversaries, large numbers of kin including those  
living in town are invited, together with people from the  
neighbourhood. Mrs Nga explained: “For every anniversary 
of one of my husband’s ancestors, we travel back to his 
hometown. It is very tiring because it involves inviting  
our kin, and the neighbours also. We have to prepare the 
celebration a few days in advance. This means baking  
cakes, preparing the chicken and all the others dishes for  
the guests. Very demanding and tiring! Especially because  
we come from far away now … it requires a great deal of  
organisation and leaving our workplace for a few days as 
well.” Despite her complaints, Mrs Nga still cares a lot  
about the proper organisation of her family’s ancestor  
worship and she explained that Bình Tân district is in no  
way her ‘heartland’; to worship her ancestors in HCMC  
would make no sense. Even though some migrants have  
now been settled in Bình Tân district for many years they  
still don’t embody their ‘sense of belonging’ through  
a too meaningful ancestor worship. 
As a result, peri-urban areas such as Bình Tân district 
can be seen as a laboratory of transitional practices in the 
Vietnamese urban context. Family celebrations are still  
organised, but in a simplified manner because of the practical 
lack of space in an urban environment, an overall decrease  
in the links between the place of abode and the so-called 
ancestor lands, and a diminishing significance of belonging  
to a neighbourhood in an urban context.
Ngô Thi. Thu Trang is an assistant-professor  
of Geography at the University of Social Sciences  
and Humanities in HCMC. 
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A heterogeneous district in the making
Bình Tân district is one of the areas that best illustrate the 
steady pace of urban development and the polymorphous 
mutations of Ho Chi Minh City today. Still classified as a rural 
district (huyện) until the year 2003, Bình Tân is now the most 
recent urban district (quận) of the Southern Vietnamese 
metropolis. The area is a strategic gateway between HCMC 
and the Mekong delta region. Its location is embodied by 
the presence of major infrastructures such as highways and 
transportation nodes – in particular bến xe miền tây, one of 
the most important metropolitan bus stations – and rapid 
industrial development over the last ten years. This urban 
context involves high migration rates and radical mutations 
of the district’s spatial organisation. The population of Bình 
Tân district increased by 60% between 2004 and 2012 (today 
reaching about 630,000 inhabitants), and about 50% of the 
population growth is linked to rural migrations, mainly from 
the Southern Vietnamese provinces.1
Once mainly inhabited by rural families who owned typical 
low-rise detached houses with small gardens (nhà vườn), 
Bình Tân district today welcomes numerous new housing 
developments, mainly dedicated to the urban middleclass. 
Furthermore, the growing industrial zones of the area attract 
many migrant workers, on a more temporary basis. These 
dwellers often stay in collective dormitories or rent individual 
rooms within existing homes. Thus, this migratory trend 
leads to social stratification and spatial reorganisation in the 
district. The current inhabitants of a once quite homogenous 
rural district are becoming progressively more diverse, now 
experiencing varying attachments to the district. The original 
dwellers relate Bình Tân to the land of their family ancestors; 
new inhabitants tend to consider the place as a recent fruitful 
investment; and migrant workers see this district as nothing 
more than a temporary and non-specific location. The appro-
priation of local space is thus quite diﬀerent from one category 
of dwellers to another. 
The evolution of the most fundamental ritual  
act in Vietnam 2
Ancestor worship is considered to be “the most fundamental 
ritual act in Vietnam” and its practice transcends the diﬀerent 
religious aﬃliations that exist in the country.3 This practice is 
not only a domestic ritual dedicated to the dead, but it is also 
a way to place every individual within a community, through 
the idea of lineage and kinship. This practice contributes to the 
production of strong social networks, by connecting places 
of birth and places of death. It honours not only the family 
ancestors on a regular basis, but it also stresses and reaﬃrms 
the family’s links with the so-called ‘ancestor land’ (quê nhà 
/đất hương hỏa).4 With the recent urbanisation trend and 
intensification of migration, the production of such networks 
faces new challenges, but continues to adapt. 
This worship works on diﬀerent temporalities. On a daily 
basis, it consists of placing flowers, incense and fruit on the 
ancestors’ altar. This small domestic altar is present in nearly 
every Vietnamese home. In addition to this daily practice, 
ancestor worshipping is put on stage on special dates, such 
as the first, second, fifth and tenth anniversary of a direct 
(patrilineal) ancestor’s death (ngày giỗ). On these occasions, a 
bigger ceremony is organised, to which the family at large, and 
even neighbours, are invited. This time and money-consuming 
ceremony is an occasion for the family to reaﬃrm its anchorage 
 within its neighbourhood and to show its wealth and its 
material success. Depending on the family religion, these two 
main temporalities of worship can be complemented by a third, 
which consists of celebrating the 1st and 15th day of each lunar 
month. This Buddhist practice is performed inside the house, 
around the ancestors’ altar and does not involve neighbours.5
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The strong urban dynamics that have been occurring in Vietnam over the past  
decades have led to a reshuﬄing of social practices, especially in the field of social  
exchanges and ritual activities. This paper gives a glimpse at evolving urban 
sociability through the lens of gift-giving practices during wedding ceremonies, 
both in Hanoi and in a rural commune of the Red River Delta, named Giao Tân.
Emmanuel Pannier
of wedding gifts runs parallel with a broader monetisation 
process of non-commercial transactions in cities, brought 
about by the urban economical context and needs. Although 
monetisation of gift-giving also occurs in the rural commune 
of Giao Tân, it happened earlier in Hanoi, where it is also  
much more widespread.
During weddings in the Giao Tân rural area, even if gifts in 
kind still occur, most of mừng-gifts are in cash, but without any 
envelopes or boxes. The name of the donor and the amount 
of money are directly registered on a gift-list held by a family 
member. The transaction occurs in public, unlike in Hanoi 
where mừng are delivered within an envelope, reflecting the 
primacy of the ‘bilateral relationship’, without many external 
social controls; in rural areas, the bilateral relationship is also 
significant but much more deeply embedded in local society, 
where reputation and dignity (face) are at stake.
Other distinctions between rural and urban weddings  
highlight the specific feature of urban sociability. In the 
countryside, villagers usually organise the wedding ceremony 
at home, and the bride’s and  groom’s personal celebrations  
are hosted separately. But in Hanoi, since the 1990s, new 
trends have appeared. Many more ceremonies are hosted  
in restaurants and even at luxurious wedding venues, if the 
family can aﬀord it. At such events, the two families often 
gather their personal guests at the same banquet place. 
Consequently, wedding preparations are not performed by 
relatives and neighbours for free anymore, within a reciprocal 
scheme called giúp đỡ (mutual aid). People who choose to rely 
on service providers in the market instead of their relatives 
argue that contractual relationships “are more reliable and 
controllable than personal relationships, which are based on 
sentiment.”5 By contrast, in Giao Tân, even if some villagers 
share this opinion, most of them continue to lean on personal 
networks, both for economic reasons and for social obligations. 
These variations illustrate urban social trends where market 
exchanges are being substituted for non-commercial trans-
actions and where impersonal-contractual relationships are  
– in some circumstances – preferred to emotion-based bonds 
framed by strong moral and social obligation. City dwellers 
tend to emancipate themselves from moral debts-bonds, which 
are a central ingredient in sealing social ties in rural areas.
Consumption and wedding ceremonies in Hanoi
The increasing consumption of commercial services for 
weddings, linked to the increasing standards of living in cities, 
leads to higher expenses for urban weddings than rural ones. 
My survey in Giao Tân indicates that wedding expenditures 
ranged from USD 250 to 1,000 between 1998 and 2009. A 
previous case study of a middleclass family wedding in Hanoi in 
1996 revealed that a total of USD 2,000 was spent to host 800 
guests.6 Nowadays in Hanoi, organising a banquet in a 4-star 
hotel costs a minimum of USD 25 per guest; renting a place and 
hiring catering services for a medium quality banquet costs an 
average of USD 100 for a table of 6. Taking the average income 
of urban dwellers into account (USD 150/month in 2012), these 
amounts are substantial investments. A lot of people have to 
borrow money in order to hold a worthy wedding celebration. 
Wedding costs increase in an urban context, but so too do the 
value of the gifts. Mừng-gifts are viewed as a contribution to the 
event. Thus, if organisers spend more for the ceremony, so do 
guests. The amount of the gift varies according to the closeness 
of the relationship, but also according to the place and type of 
ceremony. For a ‘normal relationship’ (quan hẹ không thân thiết), 
not an intimate relation (i.e., colleague, neighbour, distant kin), 
guests will give between USD 15 and 25 at a wedding in Hanoi; 
close friends and relatives will give a minimum of USD 35. In the 
countryside the average gift amount is less than half of this.
Organising a wedding or being invited to a wedding in Hanoi 
can definitely be a significant financial burden. This explains 
the Government’s attempts to contain the increase of wedding 
costs,7 especially by forbidding lavish banquets, by limiting the 
number of guests, and by discouraging prestige competition  
or status display. Locally, the Hanoi authorities even issued 
a decision (No. 07/2012/QD-UBND) prohibiting ostentatious 
excesses and indirectly targeting Party members.
In Giao Tân, except for when children migrate and organise 
their own weddings in a city, wedding costs are generally 
covered by the parents. Helping their children to start their  
lives is a strong moral duty that leads to many transactions 
from parents to children, and thus to strong moral debts for 
children who are expected to reciprocate when necessary.  
In Hanoi, more and more couples finance their weddings them-
selves, especially when they are in a better economic situation 
than their parents. These changes reflect broader shifts in  
child-parent relationships in an urbanising context, where 
reciprocal duties have been modified. The moral and legal 
responsibility of parents to support their children decreases, 
and obligations for children to take care of their parents  
when they get old, or when a parent dies, may also decline.
Gift-giving practices as a window into urban sociability
Looking at wedding gift-giving practices both in Hanoi and in 
a rural commune of the Red River Delta provides a glimpse of 
sociability changes that occur within a fast urbanising context. 
Principles of ‘non-commercial flows’ are quite similar in both 
environments, but their expressions present distinctive features. 
The control of local society on the fulfilment of obligations  
is much stronger in the countryside than in Hanoi, where  
bilateral relationships, contractual relationships and utilitarian  
consideration seem to occupy a more important place. The 
practical utility of gift-giving tends to override its social function. 
Although the reality is more subtle, in general we can state that 
the flow of financial resources sustain social relationships in the 
countryside, while in Hanoi, social relationships sustain resource 
flows. But, as long as state and market regulations (i.e., contrac-
tual, impersonal and formal relationships and exchanges based 
on law) cannot produce enough trust to ensure cooperation 
and are not suﬃcient to support the production/reproduction 
of society, ‘non-commercial flows’ and personal relationship 
networks remain central issues for urban dwellers. 
Emmanuel Pannier holds a PhD in Anthropology  
and is currently a post-doc with École française  
d’Extrême-Orient (EFEO).
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‘Non-commercial flows’ in Vietnam
Social exchanges, also called ‘non-commercial flows’, are 
understood as transactions (of goods and services) occurring 
outside the market and state channels. Because they are 
based on personal ties and aﬀect social relationships, they also 
constitute significant indicators of sociability; in this case we 
are looking at contemporary Vietnam. ‘Non-commercial flows’ 
encompass a wide variety of transactions, in various guises, 
with diﬀerent ways of transference. Underlying this diversity, 
there are nonetheless common principles. 
A ‘typical system of non-commercial flows’1 can be  
defined as a ceremonial gift-giving system based on mutual  
aid (giúp đỡ), reciprocity (có đi có lại) and moral indebtedness 
(nợ; tình nghĩa). The system is embedded in strong moral and 
social obligations that bind the participants’ relationships.  
As far as they fulfil economic and social functions, social 
exchanges widely contribute to the production/reproduction  
process of communities at local levels. Hybridisation of 
practices and traditions surrounding wedding ceremonies in 
the Red River Delta is a meaningful indicator to apprehend  
the evolution of society, especially in urban contexts. 
According to a 2005 survey held in rural provinces  
(both in the Red River province of Bắc Ninh and in the Mekong 
Delta province of Long An), the expenses related to wedding 
gifts represent an average of 13% of a family’s income.2  
A study conducted in Hanoi indicates that respondents  
participate in an average of 25 celebrations a year and spend 
6% of their budget on gift-giving.3 Furthermore, many 
informants complained about these expenses, especially  
during the wedding season, from October to March.   
A quarter of respondents said they have to borrow money 
in order to fulfil their financial obligation for ceremonies. 
Even though city-dwellers attend fewer celebrations than 
village-dwellers, social exchanges remain intense in an urban 
context. However, in contrast with countryside practices, 
many transformations can be observed. The study of gifts 
and transfers during weddings celebrated in Hanoi provide 
important clues to these changes.4
Unpacking wedding gift-giving practices  
in an urbanising society
Despite the social heterogeneity of urban dwellers in Hanoi, 
some general patterns concerning wedding gift-giving 
practices are identified. Among these trends, when attending 
a wedding in the Capital city, guests commonly bring a cash-
gift in an envelope and put it in the appropriate box before 
entering the ceremony room. These gifts are called mừng, 
which means ‘to congratulate’. Donors carefully write their 
name on the envelope and specify to whom they dedicate it: 
the parents or the married couple. In return, they will receive 
similar cash-gifts, generally of a higher amount, when they 
themselves organise such a ceremony. The monetisation 
